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ABSTRACT 
  As the opioid epidemic ravages the United States, federal and state 
legislators continue to seek various ways to mitigate the crisis. Though 
public health advocates have successfully pushed for harm-reduction 
initiatives, a contrasting punitive response has emerged. Across the 
country, prosecutors and legislators are turning to drug-induced 
homicide (“DIH”) statutes as a law-and-order response to the crisis. 
DIH statutes, which can carry sentences as severe as life in prison, 
impose criminal liability on anyone who provided drugs that led to a 
fatal overdose. Though DIH laws are often justified as tools to target 
large-scale drug distributors, in reality, they more often target friends 
or family of the deceased. Troublingly, despite the foundational 
criminal law principle that intent is required to impose culpability, DIH 
laws are strict liability offenses, requiring no intent toward the resulting 
death. 
  Examining the development of strict liability offenses in the 
American legal system, this Note asserts that criminal intent—mens 
rea—is an indispensable due process protection in homicide law. It 
argues that DIH laws, though not facially unconstitutional, are 
functionally anti-constitutional—inconsistent with the spirit, if not the 
letter, of due process. This Note is the first to reconcile DIH statutes 
with the broader context of strict liability criminal jurisprudence, 
contending that these laws impose punishment far in excess of the 
culpability they require. Accordingly, it calls upon state legislatures to 
repeal or amend these laws, offering various frameworks to better align 
DIH statutes with the protections required for criminal defendants. 
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“[A]s a vitious will without a vitious act is no civil crime, so, on the 
other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vitious will is no crime at 
all.” 
William Blackstone1 
“It used to be that cops would get called to a hotel and find someone 
with a needle in their arm and they would often go, ‘Well, that’s a real 
tragedy,’ and bag him up . . . . It’s been part of my job to convince them 
it’s not over . . . . The way I see i[t], if you kill one of my kids, you owe 
me for one dead kid and I want to collect.” 
Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, MN2 
INTRODUCTION 
In July 2013, Jarret McCasland, twenty-four years old, 
accompanied his nineteen-year-old girlfriend, Flavia Cardenas, while 
she purchased heroin from a dealer outside Baton Rouge, Louisiana.3 
Flavia paid for the drugs and asked Jarret to carry them in his pocket 
on their return home.4 The pair had a history of drug abuse; they were 
arrested together on possession charges earlier that year, and Flavia 
had once been hospitalized for an overdose before ever meeting 
Jarret.5 That evening in July, they both used heroin and, at Flavia’s 
request, Jarret injected her with cocaine.6 The next morning, Flavia was 
 
 1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 21 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 4th ed. 1770). 
 2. Sarah Horner, Metro Prosecutors Ramp Up Pursuit of Drug Dealers in Overdose Cases, 
PIONEER PRESS (Oct. 25, 2017, 9:55 AM), https://www.twincities.com/2017/10/25/twin-cities-
metro-prosecutors-ramp-up-pursuit-of-drug-dealers-in-overdose-cases [https://perma.cc/R7JD-
WEL2].  
 3. See Jamie Peck, Why Heroin Addicts Are Being Charged with Murder, ROLLING STONE 
(Aug. 2, 2018, 12:36 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/heroin-opioid-
addicts-charged-with-murder-o-d-703242 [https://perma.cc/P9GW-5GTL] (stating the couple 
“habitually used drugs together in their town outside of Baton Rouge” and describing their 
movements on the night in question). 
 4. LINDSAY LASALLE, DRUG POL’Y ALL., AN OVERDOSE DEATH IS NOT MURDER: WHY 
DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE LAWS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND INHUMANE 35 (2017), 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/dpa_drug_induced_homicide_report_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YRG5-3ZH8].  
 5. Joe Gyan Jr., Jury Convicts Denhan Springs Man of Murder, Was Accused of Injecting 
Girlfriend with Heroin Before Her Death, ADVOCATE (Apr. 30, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://
www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_f28cf6b4-d4ad-5a4e-bf11-a57dd04866aa.html 
[https://perma.cc/YS2T-UN9S].  
 6. See LASALLE, supra note 4, at 35; Jessica Pishko, When Using Heroin with a Friend Gets 
You Charged with Murder, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-
justice/2017/12/using-heroin-gets-you-charged-with-murder [https://perma.cc/KP6T-6WYH]. At 
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dead.7 Shortly thereafter, Jarret was arrested by the Baton Rouge 
police and charged with her murder.8 
At trial, state pathologists testified that Flavia died of respiratory 
failure induced by a heroin overdose.9 Expert testimony produced by 
the defense claimed that Flavia died from a multi-drug combination, 
stating that her body “was a soup of very dangerous drugs.”10 Despite 
conflicting testimony regarding the exact time of death, cause of death, 
and who purchased or administered which drugs, Jarret was found 
guilty of second-degree murder.11 The judge handed down the 
mandatory sentence—noting that its severity “bother[ed him] 
tremendously”—and Jarret, a then twenty-seven-year-old addict, 
received life in prison without parole.12  
Jarret was convicted under a Louisiana drug-induced homicide 
(“DIH”) statute imposing criminal liability on anyone who “unlawfully 
distributes or dispenses a controlled dangerous substance . . . which is 
the direct cause of the death of the recipient who ingested” the 
substance.13 Louisiana is not the only state with a specific offense 
treating deaths resulting from the delivery of certain drugs as 
homicides.14 As of January 2019, twenty-five jurisdictions have enacted 
DIH statutes.15 Penalties for these offenses vary, though the majority 
of them impose sentences of at least ten years.16 In six jurisdictions, the 
 
trial, Jarret denied giving Flavia anything besides cocaine, testifying that he watched her buy the 
heroin and inject herself with it. Id. However, Flavia’s friend testified that Jarret also injected 
Flavia with heroin. Gyan, supra note 5.  
 7. Gyan, supra note 5.  
 8. Peck, supra note 3.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Joe Gyan Jr., Judge Refuses To Alter Life Sentence for Denham Springs Man in 
Girlfriend’s Alleged Heroin Death, ADVOCATE (June 17, 2019, 4:21 PM), https://www.
theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_01619b17-92ec-52b3-a998-f22430e3f9fc.html [https://
perma.cc/5LPK-7M3D].  
 13. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(3) (2016). The shorthand “DIH” is not commonly used in 
previous academic literature regarding this topic. This Note borrows the acronym from 
Northeastern University School of Law’s Health in Justice Action Lab. E.g., Drug-Induced 
Homicide, HEALTH JUST. ACTION LAB, https://www.healthinjustice.org/drug-induced-homicide 
[https://perma.cc/M2KD-KSVY].  
 14. See Drug Induced Homicide Laws, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE POL’Y SYS. (2019), 
http://www.pdaps.org/datasets/drug-induced-homicide-1529945480-1549313265-1559075032 
[https://perma.cc/PCA4-SAGJ] (compiling DIH statutes throughout the United States that are 
valid at least through January 1, 2019).  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. (follow “3.1. What is the minimum incarceration period?” hyperlink). 
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minimum penalty is life in prison.17 In two jurisdictions, the maximum 
penalty is death.18 
Louisiana’s statute was enacted in 1987 as part of a nationwide 
trend at the height of the Reagan administration’s “war on drugs.”19 
After a high-profile celebrity overdose death in 1986,20 public outcry 
led to multiple jurisdictions enacting harsh laws to prosecute those who 
sold drugs that led to accidental overdoses.21 Despite the prevalence of 
 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. (follow “4.1. What is the maximum incarceration period?” hyperlink). The two states 
that offer a death penalty for DIH crimes are Florida and Oklahoma. Id. Colorado’s DIH law 
previously had the potential to be a capital offense, id., but the state repealed the death penalty 
in March 2020, Act of Mar. 23, 2020, ch. 61, 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 204. To date, it appears that no 
one convicted under a DIH statute has received the death penalty. The Author determined this 
by reviewing death row information for the states listed above. This search was limited to actual 
convictions, and as such would not reveal any situations where the prosecution sought a death 
penalty charge but did not obtain it.  
Florida’s DIH statute was enacted in 1972, LASALLE, supra note 4, at 57, and there have 
been no capital convictions under this statute since, see Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/execution-database [https://perma.cc/MKB4-
R8N7] (listing ninety-nine executions since 1972); Death Row Roster, FLA. DEP’T CORR., http://
www.dc.state.fl.us/OffenderSearch/deathrowroster.aspx [https://perma.cc/7WVJ-Q98F] (listing 
339 inmates on Florida’s death row). Individual Google searches for each inmate either executed 
or on death row revealed that none were convicted of DIH (database of search results on file with 
the Duke Law Journal). Oklahoma’s DIH statute was enacted in 1996, LASALLE, supra note 4, 
at 59, and there have been no capital convictions under this statute since, see Execution Database, 
supra (listing 112 inmates executed since 1996); Inmates Sentenced to Death, OKLA. DEP’T CORR., 
http://doc.ok.gov/Websites/doc/images/DRMR%202-11-2020%20NAME_NUMBER.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/Z6HE-64JU] (listing forty-seven current death row inmates). Individual Google 
searches for each inmate either executed or on death row revealed that none were convicted for 
DIH (database of search results on file with the Duke Law Journal). Colorado’s DIH law was 
enacted in 1990, LASALLE, supra note 4, at 56, and there were no capital convictions found for a 
DIH offense in Colorado after that date, see MICHAEL L. RADELET, THE HISTORY OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN COLORADO 266–77 (2016) (listing all Colorado capital sentences from 1975 
to 2015).  
 19. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 2, 58. 
 20. Rising basketball star Len Bias died from a cocaine overdose two days after being drafted 
by the Boston Celtics. Rosa Goldensohn, They Shared Drugs. Someone Died. Does That Make 
Them Killers?, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2xdSzPy [https://perma.cc/PWN2-
VVLH]. A friend of Bias was accused of providing the drugs but was later acquitted. Id. The 
outcry over Bias’s death spurred jurisdictions to pursue drug dealers, who were referred to by one 
senator as “greed-soaked mutants.” Id.  
 21. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 2; Jon Schuppe, 30 Years After Basketball Star Len Bias’ 
Death, Its Drug War Impact Endures, NBC NEWS (June 19, 2016, 8:37 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/30-years-after-basketball-star-len-bias-death-its-drug-n593731 
[https://perma.cc/3FVP-4PQV]. On the federal level, Congress added a previously rejected 
“death results” enhancement to the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), imposing a mandatory 
minimum sentence of twenty years for distribution of certain controlled substances whose use 
results in death. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2018); Brief for the United States at 3–4, Burrage v. 
United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (No. 12-7515).  
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DIH statutes, prosecutions under these provisions were initially rare.22 
Rather than viewing overdose deaths as homicides, law enforcement 
typically treated these tragedies as unintentional accidents with “no 
crime involved.”23 
In the last decade, however, the escalation of the U.S. opioid 
epidemic has instigated a sharp rise in DIH prosecutions.24 Largely due 
to the surge of prescription opioid addiction rates and the widespread 
availability of heroin and synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, overdose 
deaths dramatically increased.25 Though some advocates effectively 
lobbied for harm reduction, prevention, and treatment interventions, 
many elected officials instead pushed for punitive responses to a public 
health crisis.26 As a result, prosecutors dusted off previously idle DIH 
statutes and legislatures pushed to enact new ones.27 
DIH statutes are often justified as a “law-and-order” solution to 
the opioid epidemic.28 They are intended to penalize drug “kingpins” 
 
 22. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 2. 
 23. Mark M. Neil, Prosecuting Drug Overdose Cases: A Paradigm Shift, NAGTRI J., Feb. 
2018, at 26, http://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/journal/NAGTRI%20Journal%20Feb
%202018_final_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2AT-QTS9].  
 24. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 7; see infra Part I.C. 
 25. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 5–7; see HOLLY HEDEGAARD, MARGARET WARNER & 
ARIALDI M. MINIÑO, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1999–2016, at 1–2 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V78R-LLMM] (“The rate [of overdose deaths] increased on average by 10% 
per year from 1999 to 2006, by 3% per year from 2006 to 2014, and by 18% per year from 2014 to 
2016.”).  
 26. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 6–7, 15–16. 
 27. At least six states enacted DIH laws between 2003 and 2017. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 
56–60. Additionally, in 2019, North Carolina enacted a “Death by Distribution” statute, Act of 
July 8, 2019, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 83 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.4 (2019)), 
and Mississippi proposed its own DIH law. Infra note 267 and accompanying text. In 2018, the 
U.S. Department of Justice even urged federal prosecutors to seek capital punishment for 
overdose deaths when they considered it “appropriate.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
Attorney General Sessions Issues Memo to U.S. Attorneys on the Use of Capital Punishment in 
Drug-Related Prosecutions (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-
sessions-issues-memo-us-attorneys-use-capital-punishment-drug-related [https://perma.cc/JF97-
Q53A].  
 28. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 7; see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35.1.1 (West 2016) (targeting 
“those repeat drug offenders and upper echelon members of organized narcotics trafficking 
networks who pose the greatest danger to society”); Act approved June 4, 2003, No. 54, sec. 1, 
2003 Vt. Acts & Resolves 141, 141 (codified as amended in scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN. 
tits. 13, 18, 23 (West 2020)) (“Many people who become addicted to illegal drugs resort to small 
scale sale of drugs to support their addiction. This act is not directed at those people . . . .”). 
Though the statutes identify their purpose as targeting large-scale drug dealers, their plain text 
imposes liability for “[a]ny person” who delivers the controlled substance that results in death. 
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9(a) (emphasis added).  
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by providing strict punishments to deter “the most culpable and 
dangerous” drug dealers.29 The reality, however, is that prosecutions 
not only target “entrepreneurial drug dealers who traffic in large 
amounts of illegal drugs for profit,”30 but also focus on friends, family, 
and partners of the deceased.31 Because proving the direct cause of 
death can be difficult, prosecutors tend to focus on the last person to 
touch the drugs before the deceased consumed them rather than 
charging large-scale dealers higher up in the distribution chain.32 Often, 
the person charged is a fellow addict sharing drugs or is “simply the last 
person to see the deceased alive.”33 Thus, rather than being essential 
tools to curb the epidemic, these overbroad laws unnecessarily add to 
an abundance of available statutes for prosecuting drug offenses.34 
While affirming Jarret’s conviction, the Louisiana Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that while the DIH statute may have been intended to 
target “sellers of drugs,” it effectively “provide[d] for a much larger 
class of offenders”; namely, “anyone who simply physically delivers a 
proscribed drug.”35  
Moreover, DIH statutes require no intent toward the death itself. 
This enables the widespread surge in DIH prosecutions, despite the 
“universal and persistent” tenet of criminal law that “injury can 
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention.”36 DIH statutes do 
not require mens rea (criminal intent) for the homicide, thus operating 
either explicitly or implicitly as strict liability crimes.37 A defendant 
 
 29. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1.1; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.4(a) (encouraging 
“the criminal justice system to hold illegal drug dealers accountable”). 
 30. Sec. 1, 2003 Vt. Acts & Resolves 141. 
 31. See Drug-Induced Homicide, supra note 13 (estimating that at least half of all DIH 
prosecutions are brought against friends, family members, or partners of the deceased).  
 32. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 42. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Infra notes 262–63 and accompanying text. 
 35. State v. McCasland, 218 So. 3d 1119, 1126 (La. Ct. App. 2017). 
 36. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).  
 37. See Neil, supra note 23, at 27 (describing the various approaches states have used to 
prosecute DIH cases). Strict liability offenses do not necessarily mean that no mental state is 
necessary to commit the crime. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 358–59 (6th ed. 2017). 
Rather, “a crime may be defined so as to require one type of fault as to one element, another type 
as to another element, and no fault at all as to a third element.” Id. Essentially, “strict liability 
crimes contain a material element for which the actor’s culpability is irrelevant.” Alan C. 
Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 830 (1999). These offenses are not 
always explicitly defined as strict liability, as “[i]t is rare if ever that the legislature states 
affirmatively in a statute that described conduct is a crime though done without fault.” LAFAVE, 
supra, at 359. 
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must be “culpable for the underlying distribution offense but no 
culpability is required for the deadly result.”38 Functionally, this 
“ease[s] the prosecution’s path to conviction,”39 as the government 
only has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
intended to deliver the banned substance, not that the defendant 
intended to kill.40 
Legislatures enjoy expansive freedom to determine “the extent to 
which moral culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction.”41 Even 
so, enacting laws that impose harsh penalties but contain no minimum 
mens rea requirements runs counter to what is widely considered to be 
the very foundation of American criminal jurisprudence.42 Mens rea is 
often regarded as “the measuring rod for our system of criminal 
responsibility,”43 essential to imposing liability for causing death.44 
Unsurprisingly, then, strict liability criminal laws and their logical 
counterpart, the felony murder doctrine, have been heavily criticized 
as denying due process.45 These laws premise liability on a false 
construct of blameworthiness rather than assessing defendants via a 
measure of true culpability.46  
 
 38. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1170 (N.J. 1994). 
 39. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.  
 40. McCasland, 218 So. 3d at 1127. DIH statutes usually cover a broad range of behavior 
such as distributing, dispensing, and delivering drugs. Functionally, this means they cover “anyone 
who simply physically delivers a proscribed drug.” Id. at 1126 (emphasis added). Thus, the statutes 
are sometimes read so broadly as to provoke absurd results. To quote Judge Richard Posner, 
vacating a DIH homicide conviction:  
   Suppose you have lunch with a friend, order two hamburgers, and when your 
hamburgers are ready you pick them up at the food counter and bring them back to the 
table and he eats one and you eat the other. It would be very odd to describe what you 
had done as “distributing” the food to him.  
Weldon v. United States, 840 F.3d 865, 866 (7th Cir. 2016).  
 41. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
 42. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 731 
(1960). See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933) 
[hereinafter Sayre, Public Welfare] (outlining the rise of the exception for public welfare offenses 
and arguing that, despite the presence of this exception, a mens rea requirement is still vitally 
necessary for certain crimes).  
 43. Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 763, 771 (1999). 
 44. See Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 56 (“To inflict substantial punishment upon 
one . . . who caused injury through reasonable mistake or pure accident, would so outrage the 
feelings of the community as to nullify its own enforcement.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 43, at 763 (describing the felony murder rule’s imposition of 
strict homicide liability as “unfair, unprincipled and inconsistent with other criminal and civil 
standards”).  
 46. Id. at 771.  
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The relationship between mental state and punishment, a concept 
which is almost intuitive,47 is so fundamental to criminal law as to seem 
worthy of a constitutional guarantee.48 The irrationality of strict 
liability crimes, in the due process sense, is that they lack the basic 
requirement of actual blameworthiness—namely, the “social stigma 
which a finding of guilt carries that distinguishes the criminal penalty 
from all other sanctions.”49 Although due process requires that every 
element of an offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,50 strict 
liability offenses lessen this burden, elevating the convenience of the 
prosecution over the interests of the defendant.51 Yet strict liability 
offenses, and DIH laws in particular, are frequently and almost 
invariably upheld as constitutional.52 As DIH prosecutions surge and 
an increasing number of defendants like Jarret are tarred with the 
brush of murderer,53 it becomes more difficult to understand how this 
is consistent with due process. 
This Note grapples with that difficulty, asserting that mens rea is 
an indispensable due process protection in homicide law, even if it is 
not a constitutional guarantee. By examining the development of strict 
liability offenses in the American legal system, this Note contends that 
DIH laws, though not facially unconstitutional, are functionally anti-
 
 47. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952) (suggesting that a criminal intent 
requirement “is almost as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory ‘But I didn’t mean to’”). 
 48. For a discussion on why the notion that “the criminal sanction is inappropriate in the 
absence of mens rea” has not been as embraced by courts as it has been by legal scholars, and how 
the Court’s failure to create an “adequate method of interpretation of criminal statutes” without 
explicit mens rea requirements has compounded the issue, see Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and 
the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 107–11 [hereinafter Packer, Mens Rea]. 
 49. Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III—The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal 
Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337, 404–05 (1989). 
 50. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
 51. See Joseph E. Kennedy, The Story of Staples and the Innocent Machine Gun Owner: The 
Good, the Bad and the Dangerous, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 85, 89 (Donna Coker & Robert 
Weisberg eds., 2013) (“Since unsafe or unsanitary conditions could threaten the welfare of many 
people at once, the legislature was presumed to be deliberately omitting mental state 
requirements in order to ease the burden of proof of prosecutors . . . .”).  
 52. Infra Part III; see also Michaels, supra note 37, at 832 (“[F]or over seventy-five years the 
Court has affirmed and reaffirmed that strict liability as a general matter is constitutional.”). 
 53. See LASALLE, supra note 4, at 11 (“Though many drug-induced homicide laws have sat 
idly on the books since their enactment decades ago, prosecutors are now reinvigorating them 
with a rash of drug-induced homicide charges in the wake of increasing overdose deaths.”). 
Recent analyses of media mentions of DIH prosecutions suggest they increased by 300 percent 
from 2011 to 2016. Id. 
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constitutional—inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of due 
process.54 While previous literature on these laws has focused on their 
potential Eighth Amendment concerns or their myriad policy 
implications,55 no concerted attempt has been made to analyze DIH 
statutes within the greater context of the often-confounding strict 
liability criminal jurisprudence. This Note makes that attempt, arguing 
these statutes, as they are frequently applied, impose punishments far 
in excess of the culpability they require.  
To be clear, this Note does not articulate a specific constitutional 
challenge to these laws, nor does it contend with the potential 
difficulties in raising such a challenge. Rather, it lays out a conceptual 
roadmap to understand the tensions inherent in these statutes, drawing 
on constitutional principles to examine their inconsistencies with due 
process. It asserts that these inconsistencies render these statutes not 
only irrational, but also counter to the very framework that shapes our 
understanding of criminal law. Finally, given the futility of these laws 
and the numerous concerns they raise, this Note calls on state 
legislatures to repeal or amend DIH statutes to reconcile them with the 
protections our system guarantees to criminal defendants. 
Part I describes the opioid epidemic and evaluates public health 
and criminal justice responses to the crisis. Part II analyzes the 
historical roots of the mens rea requirement, discussing the rise of the 
public welfare exception and examining the complicated jurisprudence 
 
 54. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (stating the means the 
government uses to achieve its ends must be “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution”). 
 55. See generally Leo Beletsky, America’s Favorite Antidote: Drug-Induced Homicide in the 
Age of the Overdose Crisis, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 833 (examining DIH laws through the lens of 
public health and advocating for an inter-disciplinary approach rather than a criminal response); 
J. Richard Broughton, The Opioid Crisis and the Federal Death Penalty, 70 S.C. L. REV. 611 (2019) 
(advocating for the passage of a federal death penalty statute to prosecute DIH cases, but 
acknowledging the potential for Eighth Amendment issues); James H. Knight, Note, The First 
Hit’s Free . . . Or Is It? Criminal Liability for Drug-Induced Death in New Jersey, 34 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1327 (2004) (arguing that New Jersey’s DIH law, as applied, contravenes legislative 
intent); Stormie B. Mauck, Note, Drug Dealer or Murderer? Pennsylvania’s Approach to Drug 
Delivery Resulting in Death, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 813 (2019) (discussing Eighth Amendment 
challenges to Pennsylvania’s DIH law and concluding the DIH law, though constitutional, is 
ineffective and costly); Lynne H. Rambo, Note,  An Unconstitutional Fiction: The Felony Murder 
Rule as Applied to the Supply of Drugs, 20 GA. L. REV. 671 (1986) (arguing that applying felony 
murder logic to DIH laws contradicts longstanding causation and proportionality principles, 
potentially creating Eighth Amendment violations); Blair Talty, Note, New Jersey’s Strict 
Liability for Drug-Induced Deaths: The Leap from Drug Dealer to Murderer, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 
513 (1999) (describing New Jersey’s law as a harsh legislative overreach, flagging a potential due 
process concern before engaging in an Eighth Amendment analysis). 
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surrounding strict liability offenses and felony murder. Part III 
examines DIH statutes in light of due process concerns, highlighting 
their constitutional implications and inconsistencies. Part IV calls for a 
legislative response, arguing that retributive measures that deny liberty 
without requiring appropriate culpability offend the fundamental 
notions of justice necessary to maintain the moral ballast of our legal 
system.  
I.  THE RISE OF DIH STATUTES 
Drug-related overdose fatalities in the United States have nearly 
quadrupled since the beginning of the twenty-first century, resulting in 
a devastating and rapidly growing public health crisis.56 Although state 
and federal governments have only recently described the current state 
of affairs as an “epidemic,”57 legislative attempts to reckon with 
America’s deep dependence upon opioids are not new.58 This Part first 
provides a background of responses to the opioid crisis and then 
examines the enactment and enforcement of DIH laws. 
A. The War on Drugs and Initial DIH Enactments  
Though American society had a relatively permissive attitude 
toward narcotic use in the early half of the Republic, social and moral 
concerns prompted regulatory changes around the beginning of the 
twentieth century.59 Descriptions of drug users as criminals and 
“deviant” addicts fueled public support for increasingly punitive 
measures.60 As federal regulations cracked down on physicians who 
 
 56. Beletsky, supra note 55, at 840. 
 57. Id. at 844–46; see, e.g., Press Release, Roy Cooper, Governor of North Carolina, 
Governor Cooper Signs the Opioid Response Act and Other Bills Into Law (July 22, 2019), https:/
/governor.nc.gov/news/governor-cooper-signs-opioid-response-act-and-other-bills-law [https://
perma.cc/NJU5-99BE] (describing the passage of the Opioid Epidemic Response Act); Press 
Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, FACTSHEET: Obama Administration 
Announces Public and Private Sector Efforts to Address Prescription Drug Abuse and Heroin 
Use (Oct. 21, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/21/fact-sheet
-obama-administration-announces-public-and-private-sector [https://perma.cc/DS7D-BZHN] 
(describing the prescription drug and heroin crisis as an “epidemic”). 
 58. See Katharine A. Neill, Tough on Drugs: Law and Order Dominance and the Neglect of 
Public Health in U.S. Drug Policy, 6 WORLD MED. & HEALTH POL’Y 375, 380–85 (2014) (tracing 
the development of U.S. drug policy from the 1900s through the 1980s).  
 59. Id. at 380–81. 
 60. See id. at 381 (“This construction of the addict as psychologically dysfunctional paved the 
way for public support of incarcerating addicts in later decades.”); see also A Brief History of the 
Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALL., http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war [https://
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sold narcotics, an expanding black market developed for heroin, 
opium, and cocaine, furthering the image that drug use was a primarily 
criminal activity.61  
Despite some subtle shifts toward expanding treatment,62 the law-
and-order approach to drug regulation dominated the latter half of the 
century. In the 1980s, federal and state governments increased law 
enforcement funding to wage the “war on drugs,” escalated the 
criminalization of drug use, and ramped up fervent anti-drug rhetoric.63 
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, for example, imposed new 
mandatory minimum sentences for possession of controlled substances 
and expanded the punitive focus to include drug users, not just high-
level distributors.64 These policies, combined with increased media 
attention and public pressure to appear “tough on crime,” spurred 
federal and state politicians of both parties to champion harsher 
statutory solutions, including DIH laws.65 Despite this push, these laws 
were rarely enforced in the first few decades of their existence. This 
apathy is possibly explained by predominating stereotypes of overdose 
victims as deviant addicts unworthy of assistance,66 or by the perception 
of the opioid epidemic as solely an “urban” problem, not one shared 
by society at large.67  
These DIH statutes remained mostly unused even as the growing 
prevalence of prescription opioids led to an increase in overdose deaths 
in the 1990s.68 Between 1999 and 2011, oxycodone consumption 
 
perma.cc/94PH-PSU7] (noting that initial anti-drug legislation was disproportionately targeted at 
Chinese immigrant populations, Black men in the South, and Mexican migrants). 
 61. See Neill, supra note 58, at 380–81 (describing the passage of the Harrison Narcotic Drug 
Act of 1914); Beletsky, supra note 55, at 853 (“In the years since the establishment of this drug 
control framework, the availability and purity of illicit substances on the American black market 
have only increased, while their prices have fallen.”). 
 62. See Neill, supra note 58, at 383 (“This shift in the social construction of the addict 
necessitated a shift in the policy tools used . . . [as] evidenced in the expansion of drug 
treatment . . . .”). 
 63. Id.; A Brief History of the Drug War, supra note 60. 
 64. Neill, supra note 58, at 384. 
 65. Id.; LASALLE, supra note 4, at 2. 
 66. See Neill, supra note 58, at 380 (discussing depictions of drug users as “undeserving”). 
 67. See id. at 387 (discussing the overtones of drug-war rhetoric and stating that “[r]ace rarely 
was mentioned explicitly; instead the discussion was couched in terms of ‘urban’ and ‘inner city’ 
drug use”). As a “whiter and wealthier” generation of drug users emerged, id. at 383, 
policymakers perhaps became more apt to view those who died of overdoses as victims.  
 68. Opioid Basics: Understanding the Epidemic, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention 
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/KZP4-
7RKA]. 
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increased by almost 500 percent;69 in the same time period, the opioid-
overdose death rate more than tripled.70 Subsequent efforts to restrict 
opioid access had unintended consequences, as restrictions upon 
prescription opioids caused many dependent patients to transition to 
black market drugs, particularly heroin.71 This, coupled with the arrival 
of synthetic and highly potent opioids such as fentanyl, caused the 
overdose death rate to surge again, increasing from 45,055 overdose 
deaths in 2014 to 67,367 in 2018.72  
B. A Harm-Reduction Approach 
In response to this rapid increase of deaths, and with a growing 
recognition that drug war policies failed to effectively reduce drug use, 
alternative approaches to the zero-tolerance law-and-order model 
have emerged.73 Intensified lobbying for a public health approach to 
 
 69. Andrew Kolodny, David T. Courtwright, Catherine S. Hwang, Peter Kreiner, John L. 
Eadie, Thomas W. Clark & G. Caleb Alexander, The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A 
Public Health Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 2015 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 560, 
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122957 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZY56-W3BW]. 
 70. LI HUI CHEN, HOLLY HEDEGAARD & MARGARET WARNER, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STAT., DRUG-POISONING DEATHS INVOLVING OPIOID ANALGESICS: UNITED STATES, 1999–
2011, at 1 (2014). 
 71. See Sarah G. Mars, Philippe Bourgois, George Karandinos, Fernando Montero & Daniel 
Ciccarone, “Every ‘Never’ I Ever Said Came True”: Transitions from Opioid Pills to Heroin 
Injecting, 25 INT. J. DRUG POL’Y 257, 265 (2014) (describing study results suggesting that “medical 
and regulatory attempts to curb this [widespread availability of opioids] through monitoring and 
limiting prescribing, appear to be drawing a new generation into higher risk heroin injecting”); 
see also Opioid Basics, supra note 68 (describing the “second wave” of the opioid crisis arriving 
around 2010 with the increased prevalence of heroin use).  
 72. Rose A. Rudd, Puja Seth, Felicita David & Lawrence Scholl, Ctrs. for Disease Control 
& Prevention, Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths—United States, 2010–
2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445, 1445 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
volumes/65/wr/mm655051e1.htm [https://perma.cc/9JJK-YX66]; see Opioid Basics, supra note 68 
(describing the “third wave” of the opioid crisis). Several reports suggest that opioid overdose 
rates are increasing even more during the COVID-19 pandemic. AM. MED. ASS’N, ADVOCACY 
RESOURCE CENTER, ISSUE BRIEF: REPORTS OF INCREASES IN OPIOID RELATED OVERDOSE 
AND OTHER CONCERNS DURING COVID PANDEMIC passim (2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/
system/files/2020-09/issue-brief-increases-in-opioid-related-overdose.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A
TH-MW2B] (compiling national and state reports on increasing opioid-use mortality rates). The 
true scope of the fallout from the pandemic may not be known for some time. 
 73. See Neill, supra note 58, at 387–89 (describing the shift to a “harm-reduction approach 
[which] recognizes the permanence of drugs in society and instead of trying to eradicate drug use, 
focuses on minimizing harm associated with drug use for the individual and society”). This shift 
to a more compassionate approach may be partly spurred by the fact that heroin is now “ravaging 
largely white communities,” rather than being perceived as just an epidemic based in “poor, 
predominantly black urban areas.” Katharine Q. Seelye, In Heroin Crisis, White Families Seek 
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the crisis has obtained key legislative reforms.74 After recognizing that 
years of “just say no” policies resulted in a lack of accurate information 
concerning safe drug use, advocates have increasingly pushed to 
educate drug users on how to mitigate the risk of overdose.75 This 
education focuses on best practices such as injecting in the presence of 
other people and obtaining drugs from a consistent, trusted source.76  
Enabling such reforms is a shift in public perceptions of addiction 
and how it should be addressed.77 Increased drug-usage rates78 now 
make it far more likely that an individual has been affected by 
addiction, either through personal experience or through the 
experience of someone they know. These experiences may make 
addiction seem more relatable and less deserving of punishment.79 Set 
within the broader context of a bipartisan, nationwide shift toward 
criminal justice reform,80 general perception is starting to trend toward 
viewing the opioid crisis as a “public health problem and not just a 
criminal problem.”81 
 
Gentler War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1KKw5zt [https://perma.cc/
H456-KMVM].  
 74. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 6. Typical reforms include increasing access to overdose 
reversal agents such as naloxone and enacting “Good Samaritan” laws, which provide limited 
criminal immunity to individuals seeking help when witnessing an overdose. Id.  
 75. HARM REDUCTION COAL., GETTING OFF RIGHT: A SAFETY MANUAL FOR INJECTION 
DRUG USERS 1 (2020), https://harmreduction.org/issues/safer-drug-use/injection-safety-manual 
[https://perma.cc/VXU5-ZETY]. 
 76. See id. at 4, 67 (suggesting that “[h]aving another person around . . . can be a safety net” 
and recommending “purchas[ing] your drugs from a regular source”). 
 77. A poll conducted in 2014 showed that two-thirds of Americans believe the government 
should focus more on treatment than on obtaining prosecutions. America’s New Drug Policy 
Landscape, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.people-press.org/2014/04/02/americas-
new-drug-policy-landscape [https://perma.cc/3SJC-LFC5]. 
 78. See, e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE 
AND MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2018 NATIONAL 
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 1 (2019), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/
cbhsq-reports/NSDUHNationalFindingsReport2018/NSDUHNationalFindingsReport2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y2UR-CPQ3] (estimating that nearly one out of every five people at least twelve 
years of age used an illicit drug in 2018, a higher percentage than recorded in 2015 and 2016); 
Elizabeth D. Kantor, Colin D. Rehm, Jennifer S. Haas, Andrew T. Chan & Edward L. Giovannucci, 
Trends in Prescription Drug Use Among Adults in the United States From 1999-2012, 314 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1818, 1825 (2015) (finding that U.S. prescription drug use “increased from 51% in 1999-2000 
to 59% in 2011-2012”).  
 79. Neill, supra note 58, at 388.  
 80. See Beletsky, supra note 55, at 867 (describing various bipartisan shifts away from harsh 
punitive measures and toward sentencing reform and penalty reductions for certain drugs). 
 81. Jon Schuppe, Obama Pushes for More Treatment for Opioid Addiction, NBC NEWS (Mar. 
29, 2016, 4:18 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/obama-pushes-
more-treatment-opioid-addiction-n547441 [https://perma.cc/ZD5Y-9ARS] (quoting President 
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C. The Revitalized Use of DIH Laws 
Despite this shift, the criminal justice system still plays an outsized 
role in responding to the opioid crisis. To combat overdose deaths, 
many officials have returned to the tools of law enforcement and 
prosecution.82 Several prosecutors actively seek assistance in deploying 
these DIH laws, training law enforcement officers to “[t]reat an 
overdose scene as a homicide scene from the beginning” of a death 
investigation.83 Law enforcement officers and legislators are 
increasingly vocal about their intent to use DIH statutes as a way to 
deter drug trafficking and use,84 with various prosecutors stating they 
do not care if the defendant is themselves an addict, or even if the 
defendant did not sell drugs to the deceased.85 Though many of these 
laws also state their purpose is to prevent overdose deaths,86 no 
empirical evidence suggests that increased prosecution or a heightened 
threat of prosecution leads to a reduction in the death rate.87 In fact, 
 
Barack Obama’s remarks at the National Rx Drug Abuse and Heroin Summit in March 2016). Also, 
likely instigating this shift is the changing demographics of addicts, summarized by epidemiologist 
Dr. Daniel Ciccarone: “We had a white epidemic; we changed our tune.” Dan Vergano, This Was 
the Decade Drug Overdoses Killed Nearly Half A Million Americans, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 6, 
2019, 12:14 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/danvergano/opioid-overdose-decade-war-
on-drugs [https://perma.cc/MS32-MB54].  
 82. Neil, supra note 23, at 26. Prosecutor Damon Tyner describes the decision to resurrect 
the “underutilized” law that “kind of fell off the radar as a tool” as a necessary step “at this current 
stage of the battle.” Joe Hernandez, Atlantic County Ramps up Drug-Induced Homicide 
Prosecutions, WHYY (June 11, 2018), https://whyy.org/articles/atlantic-county-ramps-up-drug-
induced-homicide-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/V2BH-JV9N].  
 83. Patricia Daugherty & Nick Stachula, Drug-Related Homicides: Investigative and 
Prosecutorial Strategies at the National RX Drug Abuse & Heroin Summit 23 (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://naloxonestudy.org/resources/Drug-Related_Homicides_Investigative_and_Prosecutorial
_Strategies.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK8D-9RYB].  
 84. See Peck, supra note 3 (quoting Madison County State’s Attorney Tom Gibbons as 
saying, “We intend to absolutely make an example of these people in public . . . . I want to give 
them the fear of becoming the soulless people addicts become”).  
 85. See Stephanie Grady, “It’s Been Used More and More,” But is Wisconsin’s Len Bias Law 
an Effective Deterrent to Opioid Abuse?, FOX6 MILWAUKEE (Nov. 21, 2016, 9:51 PM), https://
fox6now.com/2016/11/21/its-been-used-more-and-more-but-is-wisconsins-len-bias-law-an-effective-
deterrent-to-opioid-abuse [https://perma.cc/7JW6-2SZJ] (quoting Sheboygan County District 
Attorney Joe DeCecco as saying, “A person died, so it doesn’t matter to me whether the person who 
delivered it is a fellow junkie, is a friend, didn’t sell it but actually gave it to them”). 
 86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.4 (2019) (“[D]eaths due to the opioid epidemic are 
devastating families and communities . . . . Therefore, the General Assembly enacts this law to 
encourage effective intervention by the criminal justice system . . . .”).  
 87. See LASALLE, supra note 4, at 21, 23–24, 26 (detailing rising overdose rates in states with 
many DIH prosecutions). Conversely, countries that have embraced harm-reduction initiatives 
and decriminalization have seen declining deaths and addiction rates. Shefali Luthra, How 
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DIH laws may have the opposite effect, dissuading people from 
seeking medical attention for overdoses.88 Only two states provide 
immunity from DIH charges for a person seeking medical assistance 
for an overdose;89 in every other state with a DIH law, a person may be 
placed in the untenable position of letting a friend die, or risking 
prosecution for homicide.  
Although specific data on the number of prosecutions under these 
statutes is largely unavailable, analyses of online media trends—
harnessed using big data techniques common to the health sector—
demonstrate a significant increase in DIH prosecutions since 2010.90 
Nationwide, news articles about individuals charged with DIH 
increased from 363 in 2011 to 1,178 in 2016, an increase of over 300 
percent.91  
 
FIGURE 1. NATIONWIDE DIH CHARGES BROUGHT FROM 1974–2017.92 
 
This rise in prosecutions is even more apparent when examined at 
a state-by-state level. An investigative news report in Wisconsin 
 
Germany Averted an Opioid Crisis, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 11, 2019), https://khn.org/
MTAwODU0MA [https://perma.cc/2BFF-Z7FX]. 
 88. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 3. 
 89. Id. at 40 (Vermont and Delaware). 
 90. See Beletsky, supra note 55, at 871–73, for a detailed overview of the data collection 
methodology employed to track media mentions of DIH prosecutions. Professor Leo Beletsky 
acknowledges that while media collection techniques are not optimal, they are being “used with 
increasing frequency and precision” in the health care sector. Id. at 872. Additionally, a 
comparison of Pennsylvania cases captured by the media database with that state’s court records 
suggested that even more cases were being brought than was reflected by the media coverage. Id. 
at 874–75. 
 91. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 2. 
 92. This data was sourced from various online news sources compiled by Health in Justice 
Action Lab and was last updated on September 18, 2019. Drug-Induced Homicide, supra note 13. 
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revealed that while more than 500 people were charged with DIH 
between 2000 and 2016, more than half of those charges were filed in 
the last four years of that range alone.93 Per court documents, 
Pennsylvania DIH charges steadily increased from 15 cases charged 
per year to 205 cases charged per year between 2013 and 2017.94 
Meanwhile, New Jersey, which enacted a strict liability DIH law in 
1987, has seen spikes at the county level.95 Between 1988 and 2016, the 
Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office charged only 16 DIH offenses; in 
2018, the office had already brought 13 charges by June.96 
This increase in prosecutions is facilitated by the strict liability 
nature of most DIH laws. Some states, such as New Jersey, explicitly 
do not require proof of mens rea with respect to the death,97 while other 
states, such as Pennsylvania, imply it, requiring only proof of mens rea 
toward the drug distribution and none toward the resulting death.98 
Other states, such as Florida, fold their DIH provision into a felony 
murder rule, listing drug distribution as one of many predicate felonies 
imposing liability for an accidental homicide.99 With this minimal mens 
rea requirement in place, a prosecutor seeking a homicide charge only 
needs to prove the defendant had intent to deliver drugs. The 
prosecutor can prove this intent even if the defendant did not purchase 
or sell the drugs, and even if the defendant had no intent to kill. So far, 
these laws have been viewed as constitutional. Part II explains why that 
is so, despite their potential inconsistencies with due process. 
 
 93. Bryan Polcyn, High-Level Drug Dealers Rarely Charged with Drug-Related Homicides as 
Wisconsin Death Toll Reaches 10K, FOX6 MILWAUKEE (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.fox6now.com/
news/high-level-drug-dealers-rarely-charged-with-drug-related-homicides-as-wisconsin-death-toll-
reaches-10k [https://perma.cc/2FKC-X873] (detailing the spike in Wisconsin DIH prosecutions). 
 94. Drug Delivery Resulting in Death Citations at Five-Year High, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. PA. 
(Mar. 9, 2018), http://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/news?Article=959 [https://perma.cc/
7P6U-M8CP].  
 95. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 32. 
 96. Hernandez, supra note 82. 
 97. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2016) (“Any person who manufactures, 
distributes or dispenses . . . any . . . controlled dangerous substance . . . is strictly liable for a death 
which results from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance . . . .”). 
 98. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2506(a) (2015) (“A person commits a felony of the first 
degree if the person intentionally . . . dispenses, delivers . . . or distributes any controlled 
substance . . . and another person dies as a result of using the substance.”). The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts recently noted that “at least eighteen States” have enacted strict liability 
DIH laws. Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d 812, 827 n.9 (Mass. 2019). 
 99. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(3)(4) (West 2017). 
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II.  MENS REA AND DUE PROCESS: A LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The legitimacy of DIH statutes depends in large part on the 
answer to an oft-raised question: Is there a due process mens rea 
guarantee? The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments are frequently read as being grounded in the notion of 
fundamental fairness.100 That guarantee of fairness is violated if a 
practice “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”101  
If mens rea is, in fact, so rooted in our tradition as to be 
fundamental, DIH statutes’ presumption of constitutionality does not 
seem to accord with the spirit of due process. Furthermore, even if 
there is no explicit mens rea guarantee in the Constitution itself, are 
DIH laws antithetical to our “deepest notions of what is fair and right 
and just”?102 In attempting to address these challenges, this Part 
examines the development of mens rea as a fundamental part of 
American law, describes the jurisprudence surrounding public welfare 
offenses, and attempts to reconcile mens rea’s not quite—but almost—
constitutional status.  
A. The Foundational Nature of Mens Rea in Criminal Jurisprudence 
The centrality of mens rea in criminal law developed early in 
English jurisprudence. While the early medieval English regime 
tended toward liability without wrongful intent, by the fourteenth 
century the focus shifted toward subjective blameworthiness and 
considerations of the accused’s mental state.103 The twin influences of 
Roman law, with its notions of dolus and culpa, and canonical law, with 
its concepts of moral guilt and sin, heavily steered criminal law toward 
a focus on culpability and moral wrongdoing.104 The maxim “actus non 
 
 100. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17 (1945) (“[R]eview of that guaranty of 
[due process] inescapably [requires] this Court . . . to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend 
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking 
peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.”). 
 101. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).  
 102. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), abrogated by 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 103. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 978–80 (1932) [hereinafter Sayre, 
Mens Rea].  
 104. Id. at 983. Dolus refers to an intentional violation of the law, whereas culpa refers to a 
negligent violation of the law, demonstrating the Roman legal focus upon mental state. H.D.J. 
Bodenstein, Phases in the Development of Criminal Mens Rea, 36 S. AFR. L.J. 323, 324 (1919). 
Henry Bracton, a highly influential thirteenth-century English cleric and jurist, drew heavily from 
canonical sources such as Saint Augustine to determine that “a crime is not committed unless the 
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facit reum nisi mens sit rea”—an act does not make one guilty unless 
one’s mind is guilty—became ingrained in the common-law tradition, 
as reflected in the writings of jurists such as Sir Francis Bacon and 
Edward Coke.105 By the mid-eighteenth century, William Blackstone’s 
broad statement that a “vicious will” is necessary for an act to 
constitute a crime was universally accepted.106 Following this principle, 
judges at common law interpreted crimes as requiring not only a 
prescribed act or omission, but also a prescribed state of mind.107 
Accordingly, mens rea became accepted as a “sacred principle of 
criminal jurisprudence.”108  
As mens rea developed for the general body of criminal law, its 
emergence became an essential factor for “true crimes”109 in general 
and for homicide in particular, “gradual[ly] freeing from criminal 
responsibility . . . those who killed without guilty intent.”110 The 
interests of the individual, “demand[ing] maximum liberty and 
freedom from interference,” were of such importance that the system 
was concerned with preventing potential injustices.111 It was considered 
reprehensible “[t]o inflict substantial punishment upon one who [was] 
morally entirely innocent.”112 Coupled with the logic that unintentional 
acts were not considered as menacing to society as intentional acts 
were, the individual interests at stake in the case of “true crimes” were 
 
intention to injure exists.” Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role 
of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 655 (quoting 2 HENRY 
DE BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 384 (Samuel E. Thorne 
trans., 1968)); see also id. at 659 (reading Bracton “as embracing the notion that both bad motive 
and intentional acts are essential for criminal liability”).  
 105. See Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note 103, at 988, 993 (“[I]t was universally accepted law that 
an evil intent was as necessary for felony as the act itself.”); LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 313–14 
(“[I]n more recent times (i.e., since about 1600), the judges have generally defined common law 
crimes in terms which require, in addition to prescribed action or omission, some prescribed bad 
state of mind . . . .”).  
 106. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 
1, at 21).  
 107. LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 313–14.  
 108. Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note 103, at 974 n.2 (quoting Duncan v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 
148, 150 (1846)).  
 109. This Note uses the term “true crime” in the same way as scholar Francis Bowes Sayre in 
Public Welfare Offenses, referring to certain crimes, such as murder and theft, that necessitate a 
showing of intent. Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 80. Sayre argued that extending the 
public welfare doctrine to true crimes “would sap the vitality of the criminal law.” See id. at 56, 
84 (“[M]ens rea is as vitally necessary for true crime as understanding is necessary for goodness.”). 
 110. Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note 103, at 995. 
 111. Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 68.  
 112. Id. at 56.  
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so significant they demanded the prerequisite of “evil intent” in order 
to be justifiably punished.113  
Even after most American jurisdictions abolished common-law 
crimes, they still imported mens rea into their criminal statutes, further 
enshrining its importance in criminal law.114 Though definitions of 
mens rea have varied, the modern trend describes it as the mental state 
necessary to commit a defined element of an offense.115 Thus, mens rea 
has become so ingrained in the American system that it “is as universal 
and persistent . . . as belief in freedom of the human will and a 
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose 
between good and evil.”116 Yet, despite this consistent focus on mens 
rea as a necessary predicate for punishment, a large body of strict 
liability offenses emerged.  
B. Strict Liability Crimes  
Criminal law is, in theory, hostile to strict liability crimes.117 The 
departure from the traditional mens rea requirement is frequently 
criticized as irreconcilable with fundamental standards of culpability.118 
Yet, despite these critiques, a vast body of strict liability offenses exists 
 
 113. Id. at 68.  
 114. LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 314; see also Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 703 (1877) 
(“All punitive legislation contemplates some relation between guilt and punishment. To inflict 
the latter where the former does not exist would shock the sense of justice of every one.”). 
 115. This definition of mens rea is sometimes referred to as the narrower or “elemental” 
approach. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 169 (7th ed. 2016). The 
broader “culpability” approach views criminal acts as requiring a morally culpable state of mind, 
considering an individual guilty if they committed a socially harmful act with any morally 
blameworthy state of mind. Id. The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) wholeheartedly embraces the 
elemental approach, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 1, at 229–31 (AM. L. INST. 1962), requiring 
specific culpability in order to issue condemnation, a concept its drafters considered “too 
fundamental to be compromised,” id. § 2.05 cmt. 1, at 283.  
 116. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952). 
 117. Kennedy, supra note 51, at 88; see United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437–
38 (1978) (explaining that strict liability offenses have a “generally disfavored status”). 
 118. Wasserstrom, supra note 42, at 734; see generally id. (providing an overview of the 
voluminous scholarship criticizing strict liability and cataloguing various arguments for and 
against the doctrine). Critics of the doctrine argue that imposing criminal punishment on someone 
who did not intend to produce the result of their conduct does not serve at least two of the primary 
justifications of criminal law: deterrence and rehabilitation. Id. at 734. Conversely, proponents 
argue that the existence of strict liability offenses influences people to act with greater caution 
when engaging in certain activities or keeps people from engaging in them entirely. Id. at 737. 
These proponents also point to the vast number of strict liability offenses, reasoning that even if 
they should be condemned, their sheer scope shows that they decidedly are not. Id. at 741.  
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in federal and state law.119 To fully appreciate the tension present in 
strict liability criminal law—and the innate issues DIH statutes 
implicate—it is necessary to examine the conflicting ways the Supreme 
Court has approached strict liability offenses. This Section provides the 
historical context necessary to understand how DIH laws are justified, 
cataloging the emergence of the public welfare exception as well as the 
Court’s attempt to cabin that very doctrine, and addressing the 
continued presence of felony murder.  
1. The Development of the Public Welfare Exception.  Despite the 
recognized importance of mens rea, the progressively complex social 
order emerging out of the Industrial Revolution prompted exceptions 
to its absolute requirement.120 The complications and growth from 
industrialization—including traffic, congestion, and the wider 
distribution of goods—created a pressing need for a vast regulatory 
scheme; this scheme necessitated the creation of minor offenses that 
could only be enforced effectively by disregarding state of mind.121 
Criminal justice shifted its emphasis from protecting the individual to 
preserving the public welfare, increasingly using criminal law to 
enforce regulations by prohibiting acts that were not necessarily 
morally blameworthy, but that, if left unchecked, would pose a threat 
to the greater good.122  
These public welfare laws—criminalizing such conduct as selling 
intoxicants or impure food—required no proof that a defendant had 
any intent to commit the offense.123 The offenses predominately 
imposed low-level fines as a form of criminal sanction; incarceration, if 
mandated, was typically for durations under a year.124 The lax criminal 
 
 119. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict 
Liability, 62 DUKE L.J. 285 (2012) (cataloging the persistence of strict liability offenses in state 
courts). 
 120. See Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 67 (describing the gradual use of strict 
liability offenses to enforce the additional regulation required for a more complex society). 
 121. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254–55 (“Such dangers have engendered increasingly 
numerous and detailed regulations . . . . Lawmakers . . . sought to make such regulations more 
effective by invoking criminal sanctions to be applied by the familiar technique of criminal 
prosecutions and convictions.”); Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 68–69 (“[T]oday the 
crowded conditions of life require social regulation to a degree never before attempted.”). 
 122. Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 68. 
 123. Id. at 70 n.54.  
 124. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Paul Huck, Counting Cases About Milk, Our “Most Nearly 
Perfect” Food, 1860–1940, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 87 (2002) (surveying historical convictions 
for the sale of adulterated milk and finding that “[f]ines were the overwhelming choice of 
sanctions in the criminal cases.” They “ranged from $10 to $500, with $25 as the most common 
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punishment and the lack of stigma carried by a lower charge tempered 
the departure from the mens rea requirement.125 One justification for 
upholding strict liability crimes was that since these regulatory offenses 
were not truly punished in the same manner as “infamous crimes,” the 
absence of mens rea was permissible.126 Though some influential 
commentators have argued that any crime punishable by a felony 
conviction or lengthy imprisonment requires mens rea and cannot be 
considered a public welfare offense,127 courts have declined to draw a 
firm boundary around the exact limits of the doctrine.128  
2. Modern Strict Liability Doctrine.  The Model Penal Code 
(“MPC”)129 takes a direct approach, declaring “a frontal attack on 
absolute or strict liability . . . whenever the offense carries the 
possibility of criminal conviction.”130 However, the constitutional 
 
amount”); see also MASS. STATE BD. OF HEALTH, LUNACY & CHARITY, FOURTH ANNUAL 
REPORT 35 (1883) (“Whoever kills . . . for the purpose of sale, any calf less than four weeks 
old . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . . not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding 
two hundred dollars . . . .”).  
 125. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 (“[P]enalties commonly are relatively small, and 
conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.”).  
 126. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 617 (1994) (quoting Tenement House Dep’t v. 
McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 168 (1915)). 
 127. E.g., Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 72.  
 128. The Court once hinted at a boundary in Staples v. United States: 
Close adherence to [precedent] might suggest that punishing a violation as a felony is 
simply incompatible with the theory of the public welfare offense. In this view, absent 
a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is not required, we should not apply the 
public welfare offense rationale to interpret any statute defining a felony offense as 
dispensing with mens rea. 
511 U.S. at 618–19. However, the Court immediately followed the above with a but see citation to 
United States v. Balint. Id. at 618 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)). In Balint, 
the Court upheld a strict liability offense under the Narcotics Act, which the Court characterized 
as “a taxing act with the incidental purpose of minimizing the spread of addiction to the use of 
poisonous and demoralizing drugs.” 258 U.S. at 253–54. A violation of the Narcotics Act was 
punishable by a maximum five-year prison sentence, a fine of up to $2,000, or both. Act of Dec. 
17, 1914, ch. 1, sec. 9, 38 Stat. 785, 789.  
 129. The MPC, first published by the American Law Institute in 1962, was developed “to 
provide a reasoned, integrated body of material that will be useful in [a] legislative effort” to 
reexamine criminal codes. Herbert Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on 
Its Model Penal Code, 42 A.B.A. J. 321, 321 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Symposium on the Model 
Penal Code Foreword, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 589, 589 (1963).  
 130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1, at 282 (AM. L. INST. 1962). The MPC only allows 
strict liability for crimes that are described as “violations” rather than “offenses,” and which carry 
no greater punishment than a fine or penalty. Id. at 283, cmt. 2, at 291. Such violations include: 
“Polluting Streams,” “Possessing a Machine Gun,” and “Shooting Domesticated Pigeons.” Id. at 
cmt. 1, at 286, 288. 
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doctrine around strict liability is decidedly less clear, muddied by the 
Supreme Court’s inconsistent treatment of the mens rea requirement.  
The Court disregarded due process concerns with multiple public 
welfare offenses in the early twentieth century. It acknowledged that 
dispensing with conventional mens rea requirements created the 
“possible injustice of subjecting an innocent” to criminal penalties, but 
ultimately concluded that it was permissible in the interest of the public 
good.131 The Court seemed to rationalize its concern about any possible 
injustices by placing its trust in prosecutorial discretion, relying on their 
“conscience and circumspection” to protect the innocent.132 That trust 
apparently did not last long, however, as later decisions suggested that 
punishment without culpability could raise constitutional concerns. 
In Morissette v. United States,133 the Court recognized public 
welfare offenses as permissible but warned that the judiciary should 
not extend the “impairment[s]” of these strict liability cases to 
common-law crimes:134 specifically, that they should not remove due 
process protections such as the presumption of innocence.135 The Court 
seemed heavily influenced by the nature of the crime at issue in 
Morissette—theft, one of the “earliest offenses known to the law.”136 
Accordingly, the crime had such deep common-law roots that it was 
only natural for the judiciary to read traditional mens rea presumptions 
into the statute, despite no explicit direction from the legislature.137 The 
Court took Morissette’s preoccupation with mens rea even further in 
Lambert v. California,138 striking down a state statute as facially 
 
 131. Balint, 258 U.S. at 254; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943); see 
Kennedy, supra note 51, at 90 (stating the Court “framed the issue as a simple tradeoff between 
public danger and potential innocence”).  
 132. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913)); 
see also id. (“In such matters the good sense of prosecutors . . . must be trusted.”). Notably, the 
dissent referred to this “blind resort” to prosecutorial discretion as “precisely what our 
constitutional system sought to avoid.” Id. at 292 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  
 133. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
 134. Id. at 262–63. 
 135. Id. at 275.  
 136. See id. at 260–61 (noting that, historically, state courts “have consistently retained the 
requirement of intent in larceny-type offenses”). 
 137. See id. at 252 (“Even if their [statutory] enactments were silent on the subject, [state] 
courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely 
recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory 
affirmation.” (emphasis added)). 
 138. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
PHILLIPS IN PRINTER FINAL 11/16/2020  7:39 PM 
2020] FROM OVERDOSE TO CRIME SCENE 681 
violative of due process.139 In doing so, it indicated that punishment 
without culpability might raise constitutional concerns. Though some 
scholars predicted Lambert might finally elevate mens rea to 
constitutional status,140 the case has remained an anomaly, rarely 
followed by lower courts.141 Despite the pronouncements in Morissette 
and Lambert, the Court continued to uphold strict liability criminal 
offenses.142 The Court, however, again signaled an implicit mens rea 
requirement in subsequent cases, most notably Staples v. United 
States,143 which is frequently relied upon by state courts.144 Following 
the principles laid out in Morissette, the Court overturned criminal 
convictions by interpreting various federal statutes as requiring mens 
rea—including offenses that were arguably traditional public welfare 
laws.145  
 
 139. Id. at 229–30; see Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal 
Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1269 (1998) (describing Lambert as the closest the Court has ever 
come “to constitutionalizing a mens rea requirement as fundamental to the just imposition of a 
criminal sanction”).  
 140. See Kennedy, supra note 51, at 92 (describing Lambert as a flirtation with the idea that 
sufficient mens rea “was not just a statutory presumption grounded in common law tradition but 
a matter of due process grounded in the Constitution itself” but noting “[t]hese flirtations 
amounted to nothing”); Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The 
Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 861, 866 (1999) 
(describing Lambert and the Court’s decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), as 
giving “rise to expectations that the Warren Court was prepared to read requirements of blame 
and guilt into the Constitution,” expectations which were quickly dashed).  
 141. See Cynthia Alkon, The Lost Promise of Lambert v. California, 49 STETSON L. REV. 267, 
278–79 (2020) (surveying federal and state cases where the defendant cited to Lambert, and 
finding that the defendant only prevailed on their claims in 3.5 percent and 1.6 percent of the 
cases, respectively). 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609–10 (1971) (upholding a public welfare 
offense regulating the sale of grenades). 
 143. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). 
 144. Id. at 605. Though Staples focused on the interpretation of a federal statute and is thus 
not binding authority in state courts, “its widespread use by state courts suggest[s] that [it] struck 
a chord that is deeply fundamental to our criminal jurisprudence, even if not constitutional.” 
Kennedy, supra note 51, at 121. 
 145. See United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 71–72 (1994) (reading mens rea into 
a statute prohibiting the possession and distribution of child pornography); Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994) (reading mens rea into a statute prohibiting the structuring of 
cash transactions), superseded by statute, Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1994 § 411, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (codified as amended 
at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a), (b), 5324(c) (1994)); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433–34 
(1985) (reading mens rea into a statute regulating the sale of food stamps). Scholars suggest “[t]he 
significance of these cases is difficult to overstate,” noting that, while not abolishing strict liability, 
they “extended Morissette’s central concern with ruling out punishment without culpability to all 
federal crimes, even public welfare offenses.” Stephen F. Smith, “Innocence” and the Guilty Mind, 
69 HASTINGS L.J. 1609, 1623 (2018) (emphasis omitted). 
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While Morissette and its progeny do not prohibit a legislature from 
enacting a strict liability crime, they suggest that a legislature’s ability 
to do so has constitutional limits.146 What exactly those limits are, 
though, is less clear. The Court has so far declined to delineate a 
constitutional border around strict liability offenses.147 However, it 
appears that the ability of a legislature to remove mens rea from an 
offense depends upon a two-part analysis. First, a court considers if the 
statute qualifies as a public welfare offense, examining the severity of 
the penalty imposed, the stigma likely to arise from a conviction, and 
the type of conduct or item being regulated.148 If the items regulated 
are inherently dangerous, then a sharper penalty can be imposed in the 
absence of mens rea,149 though an item’s inherent danger “does not 
necessarily suggest . . . that it is not also entirely innocent.”150 Second, 
if the crime bears serious penalties, imposes severe stigma, and does 
not regulate sufficiently dangerous items, then due process seems to 
require that a mens rea element be read into the statute.151 
Furthermore, if the crime has a deep common-law history, then a court 
should strongly presume that the offense’s traditional mens rea 
applies.152  
 
 146. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (“There is wide latitude in the 
lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its 
definition . . . . On the other hand, due process places some limits on [the police power’s] 
exercise.”); cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (stating that while a legislature 
has the ability to define the elements of an offense, “there are obviously constitutional limits 
beyond which the states may not go in this regard”).  
 147. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 618, 620 (“We need not adopt such a definitive rule of 
construction . . . . [I]f Congress had intended to make outlaws of gun owners who were wholly 
ignorant of the offending characteristics of their weapons . . . it would have spoken more clearly 
to that effect.”). 
 148. Id. at 607, 616–18.  
 149. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (upholding a ten-year sentence under 
a strict liability statute regulating the sale of grenades as justified in the “interest of public 
safety”).  
 150. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 611 (distinguishing the gun at issue from the hand grenade in 
Freed, stating “[e]ven [some] dangerous items can . . . be so commonplace and generally available 
that we would not consider them to alert individuals to the likelihood of strict regulation”). 
 151. Id. at 611, 617–18. Notably, the Court read in a requirement of knowledge into each 
statute, not just negligence or recklessness, thus implying that mens rea requirement “often 
requires considerably more than minimal culpability.” Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 137 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, Proportional Mens Rea] (emphasis 
omitted).  
 152. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (stating that “where Congress 
borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of 
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed 
word in the body of learning from which it was taken”). 
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3. Felony Murder and Other Strict Liability Homicides.  Further 
complicating the issue is a long line of precedent upholding the 
constitutionality of felony murder. Felony murder, though harshly 
criticized as “an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal law,”153 has 
nonetheless remained a fixture in the American legal system.154 The 
rule imposes liability for homicide based “on the culpability required 
for the underlying felony,” not for any culpability toward the resulting 
death.155 Like many DIH statutes, where liability for homicide attaches 
from the act of delivering drugs, felony murder operates as a form of 
strict liability. The MPC explains the rule as making sense only if one 
considers mens rea as requiring “a general criminal disposition” rather 
than a specific mental state toward each element of the offense.156 
Felony murder is predicated on the concept that anyone who commits 
a felony is a “bad person with a bad state of mind . . . [who] has caused 
a bad result”; therefore, there should be no concern that the homicidal 
result was far different or worse than the result the perpetrator actually 
intended.157 As the theory goes, such crimes should be punished as 
murders because the commission of the felony itself “expresses a 
commitment to particularly reprehensible values.”158 
Though Part III discusses how felony murder cannot coherently 
justify DIH statutes, this Note will not fully outline the arguments for 
and against felony murder, which have been extensively catalogued in 
other works.159 Despite the vociferous critiques of felony murder, 
 
 153. H.L. Packer, Criminal Code Revision, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1973).  
 154. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06(A), at 557 (4th ed. 2006). 
Though felony murder was present at common law, it has since been abrogated in the United 
Kingdom. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at 
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 448 n.12 (1985). Some states have abolished 
felony murder via statute or judicial decree or have limited the doctrine in other ways. Id. at 446 
nn.6–8. Recently, California amended their felony murder rule “to ensure that murder liability is 
not imposed on a person who . . . did not act with the intent to kill.” Act of Sept. 30, 2018, ch. 
1015, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1015 (West).  
 155. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (AM. L. INST. 1962). 
 156. Id. 
 157. LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 1010.  
 158. See Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 
967 (2008) [hereinafter Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder] (providing “the long-missing 
principled defense of the felony murder doctrine”).  
 159. E.g., id. at 966 n.3. Professors Nelson Roth and Scott Sundby’s frequently cited critique 
is particularly illuminating. See generally Roth & Sundby, supra note 154 (arguing that the felony 
murder rule may violate due process and the Eighth Amendment). They argue, for instance, that 
a prosecutor charging a defendant with homicide without a culpable mental state improperly 
shifts the burden of proof from the prosecutor, creating a presumption of guilt rather than one of 
innocence. Id. at 469–71.  
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courts tend to defer heavily to the power of the legislature to create 
these offenses, viewing the vitality of the felony murder rule as a 
“strong indicat[ion] of states’ power to impose strict criminal 
liability.”160 In this way, the felony murder rule self-perpetuates. Its 
constitutionality is used to uphold strict liability offenses,161 which then 
are used as evidence to support the validity of felony murder. 
C. Mens Rea’s Semi-Constitutional Status 
The continued presence of strict liability in criminal law conflicts 
with the Supreme Court’s own pronouncement that “the existence of a 
mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to the principles of 
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.”162 Though repeatedly 
recognizing mens rea as a fundamental principle of justice, the Court’s 
“sanction[ed] . . . erosion” of that very principle through strict liability 
and felony murder creates uncertainty.163 This lack of clarity 
surrounding the doctrinal role of mens rea is exemplified by Professor 
Herbert Packer’s famous quip: “Mens rea is an important requirement, 
but it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes.”164  
It is important to note that the Morissette and Staples line of cases 
primarily focused on statutory interpretation and did not take up any 
direct constitutional questions. Yet, given the strong echoes of due 
process in these opinions,165 one wonders if constitutional avoidance 
played a large role.166 In each case, the Court was faced with multiple 
plausible interpretations of a statute, including one interpretation that 
could, by the Court’s own guidelines,167 be unconstitutional. Rather 
than reaching the due process question or fully probing the limits to 
 
 160. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1171 (N.J. 1994); see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 568, 
602 (1978) (“That States have authority . . . to enact felony-murder statutes is beyond 
constitutional challenge.”). 
 161. See Maldonado, 645 A.2d at 1174 (relying on “the implicit validation of the felony-
murder rule itself” to uphold a DIH statute). 
 162. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). 
 163. Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 48, at 152. 
 164. Id. at 107 (emphasis omitted). 
 165. E.g., supra notes 116, 140, 144 and accompanying text. 
 166. The modern version of the avoidance canon dictates that if a plausible interpretation of 
a statute raises “constitutional doubts,” the reviewing court must select a different interpretation, 
thus avoiding the constitutional issue. Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and 
as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1282 (2016). To clarify, “the court need not find that the 
avoided reading is actually unconstitutional, the court must only find that there is a good chance 
of it being unconstitutional.” Id.  
 167. Supra notes 134–35, 145 and accompanying text. 
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which these statutes could go, the Court simply sidestepped the issue 
each time by reading mens rea into the statute.168 If these cases did rely 
on the avoidance canon, even if only implicitly, it suggests they can be 
considered quasi-constitutional rulings. Simply put, if there was no 
interpretation to avoid that would deprive a defendant of due process, 
there would be no plausible constitutional objections to these types of 
statutes. Given this pattern of avoidance, the Court has not 
persuasively justified its own position that strict liability is nearly 
always constitutional. It has instead repeatedly signaled that there must 
be some limit to strict liability crimes,169 perhaps dictated by a long 
common-law tradition and the concept of due process.170  
In the wake of these flirtations with a constitutional mens rea 
requirement, scholars have struggled to articulate a cogent principle 
that explains mens rea’s not quite, but almost, constitutional status. 
Professor Joe Kennedy contends that mens rea was never fully 
enshrined as a due process concern because the Court “was loath to 
categorically rule that such ends could never justify the means,”171 
instead granting legislatures wide latitude to criminalize offenses as 
they thought necessary to protect the public welfare. But despite the 
Court’s willingness to defer to legislative judgment, there remains a 
consistent concern that laws “clearly designed for the very bad may end 
up being successfully used against the possibly good.”172 Other scholars 
take similar positions, positing that as the Court is no longer willing to 
trust solely in the good faith of prosecutors,173 it instead selectively 
requires mens rea as a way to protect innocents from criminal 
liability.174 
Though using different analytical frameworks, these scholars all 
agree that the Court imposes a mens rea requirement when it is 
concerned that the defendant in front of them is not sufficiently 
blameworthy.175 Rather than elevating mens rea to constitutional 
 
 168. Supra note 145 and accompanying text. In one of these cases, the Court explicitly 
engaged in constitutional avoidance, but did so to avoid reaching a First Amendment issue. 
United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 69, 73 (1994). 
 169. Supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 170. E.g., supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 171. Kennedy, supra note 51, at 125.  
 172. Id. 
 173. John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal 
Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (1999).  
 174. Singer & Husak, supra note 140, at 862. 
 175. This form of innocence protection manifests for Kennedy as a judicial preoccupation 
with character. See Kennedy, supra note 51, at 86 (“Staples . . . seems to resonate most when 
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status, the Court uses it as a final safety valve to prevent punishing 
those who society does not view as truly culpable. To justify the 
existence of felony murder and the jurisprudence around strict liability 
offenses, however, these scholars view the mens rea requirement as 
only carving out a space for the completely innocent. If the offender is 
engaging in inherently dangerous or criminal behavior, or if the 
intentional conduct covered by the statute could be criminalized, then 
the statute is constitutional.176  
This distinction, while useful, does not fully explain the tension in 
the doctrine. The Court’s own jurisprudence suggests the mens rea 
requirement is tethered to more than just a desire to protect the 
completely innocent. Rather, it also indicates a preoccupation with 
proportional innocence. The Staples line of cases hints at a deeper 
concern with accurately tailoring punishment to blame.177 In these 
cases, the Court did not just read mens rea into each statute; it also 
stated that the penalties were so severe as to require knowledge rather 
than just recklessness or negligence,178 which are more traditionally 
used as defaults in the absence of explicit mens rea requirements.179 
Similarly, when determining what qualified as a permissible public 
welfare offense, the Court analyzed both the severity of the 
punishment and the dangerousness of the activity180—comparing the 
proportionality of the sanction to the blameworthiness of the offense.  
 
people of good character are prosecuted under statutes designed for the very bad.”). Professor 
John Wiley frames the issue as a rule of mandatory culpability. Wiley, supra note 173, at 1022 
(“This method of construction gives new form to an old and simple ideal: We do not convict 
blameless people.”). Professor Alan Michaels reconciles this as a principle of constitutional 
innocence. See Michaels, supra note 37, at 834 (stating that constitutional innocence means strict 
liability offenses are only constitutional “when, but only when, the intentional conduct covered 
by the statute could be made criminal by the legislature”).  
 176. See Kennedy, supra note 51, at 122 (“Staples will be used to read in additional mens rea 
requirements only for those who are completely innocent, not simply partially innocent of some 
additional crime or enhancement.” (emphasis added)); Michaels, supra note 37, at 879 (“Some 
level of culpability is supplied by the actor’s choice to engage in the voluntary act covered by the 
statute.”).  
 177. See Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 151, at 137 (“Proportionality, in short, has 
been smuggled into the mens rea analysis . . . through the back door.”).  
 178. See Wiley, supra note 173, at 1112 (“The Court apparently has adopted the ‘knowledge’ 
standard as the default, rather than the option of ‘recklessness,’ or ‘negligence.’”). 
 179. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 5 (AM. L. INST. 1962); Dannye Holley, The Influence 
of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost 
Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229, 243–44 
(1998) (detailing how the states that have adopted a default culpability have primarily chosen 
either recklessness or negligence).  
 180. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616–18 (1994). 
PHILLIPS IN PRINTER FINAL 11/16/2020  7:39 PM 
2020] FROM OVERDOSE TO CRIME SCENE 687 
Professor Stephen Smith helps explain this tension.181 Innocence 
also exists, Smith argues, “when a prohibited act, though blameworthy, 
is insufficiently blameworthy to deserve the penalties authorized by the 
statute under which the offender is prosecuted.”182 Smith refers to this 
as a “culpability gap”: the gap between the higher level of culpability 
intended by the legislature and the lower level manifested in the 
offender’s actions.183 The question is not just whether the offender 
committed any criminal act. It is also whether that act makes them 
“sufficiently culpable” to deserve the defined punishment.184 
The culpability gap is further illuminated when applied to strict 
liability homicide offenses—specifically, DIH laws. The Court has 
explained that for a certain class of common-law crimes, particularly 
homicide, “heightened culpability has been thought to merit special 
attention.”185 The standard escalating structure of homicide offenses 
correlates more culpable mental states with increasing levels of 
punishment, creating a system of “proportional punishment for 
blameworthy acts.”186 Strict liability DIH laws, then, do not harmonize 
with homicide’s traditional structure of proportional punishment.  
If one accepts the justifications for strict liability offenses, it seems 
a legislature can criminalize any conduct without requiring mens rea as 
long as the statute can rationally be said to protect public safety. The 
only seeming outer boundary is the rule that criminal law “does not 
offend fundamental notions of justice.”187 But imposing a lengthy 
sentence and homicide liability on someone who lacked the intent to 
kill seems intuitively to do just that. It is in light of this disconnect—
this culpability gap—that DIH statutes must be reexamined. 
 
 181. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 151, at 136.  
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted).  
 185. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980) (suggesting the distinction between 
degrees of homicide, which ascribes higher levels of fault for higher levels of intent, implies that 
certain crimes require a closer examination of culpability); see also Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note 
103, at 995 (emphasizing the importance of culpability for “true crimes” such as homicide). 
 186. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 151, at 133–34. 
 187. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1174 (N.J. 1994); cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197, 210 (1977) (finding that “there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the [s]tates 
may not go” in creating criminal offenses).  
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III.  MENS REA CONCERNS WITH DIH STATUTES 
DIH statutes can perhaps be understood as either public welfare 
offenses, ostensibly regulating dangers to the public, or as felony 
murder analogs, imposing liability for accidental death during the 
commission of a felony. Under either framing, these statutes raise 
constitutional concerns. This Part first examines how DIH statutes fit 
within the concept of a culpability gap, considering how past challenges 
to these statutes support this view. It then looks at the specific concerns 
with both the public welfare and felony murder constructions, using 
New Jersey and Florida’s DIH statutes as examples. 
A. DIH Statutes and the Culpability Gap  
The majority of offenders prosecuted under these DIH laws do 
not fit the model of “complete innocence.” Undeniably, most 
defendants charged under these statutes are engaged in some form of 
illegal conduct—possessing or distributing unlawful drugs. If one 
accepts the views of Kennedy and others, the fact that these defendants 
voluntarily engaged in any sort of illegal conduct makes DIH laws 
presumptively constitutional.  
But this view lacks context when applied to DIH statutes, 
overlooking that, for many of the individuals prosecuted by these 
laws,188 these are crimes caused by addiction. Rather than possessing 
“a moral failing or character flaw,” these individuals suffer from a 
chronic illness.189 Often an addict’s “behavior is driven by a compulsive 
craving for the drug,” making drug use far less voluntary than criminal 
policy suggests.190 Drug-war policies have long been predicated on the 
stereotype that drug dealers are morally blameworthy individuals 
choosing to take advantage of addicts.191 As our understanding of 
 
 188. Supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.  
 189. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA: THE 
SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH 2-1 (2016), https://
addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-generals-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V7EK-4F8Q] (“[S]evere substance use disorders . . . are now understood to be chronic illnesses 
characterized by clinically significant impairments in health, social function, and voluntary control 
over substance use.”).  
 190. Alan I. Leshner, Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and Its Treatment, 282 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 1314, 1314 (1999); see also id. (“While addiction traditionally has been thought of as 
simply using a lot of drugs or as just physical dependence on a drug, advances in both science and 
clinical practice have revealed that what matters most in addiction is often an uncontrollable 
compulsion to seek and use drugs.”). 
 191. See, e.g., Neil, supra note 23, at 28 (discussing DIH as a tool to combat “drug dealers who 
take advantage of those who have become addicted to opioids”). 
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addiction evolves, however, this stereotype proves to be misleading. 
Many of those who sell drugs are not stereotypical drug kingpins, but 
addicts themselves.192 Drug sharing, or pooling money and sending one 
person out to buy drugs for multiple people, is common.193 The 
defendants prosecuted under these laws are guilty of some illegal 
conduct, but are being punished for homicide—conduct of an entirely 
different type and degree.194 
Even accepting there are some individuals targeted under these 
statutes that may fit a more traditional conception of culpability does 
not alleviate this discomfort. It is possible to imagine the defendant the 
legislature was targeting when enacting these statutes: an immoral drug 
dealer peddling their wares with depraved indifference to any resulting 
loss of life. Yet there is a tangible difference in blameworthiness 
between an individual who knowingly distributes heroin tainted with 
fentanyl,195 and a woman who gives her husband some of her legally 
prescribed medication to help him sleep.196 As strict liability crimes, 
DIH laws consider both individuals equally worthy of the same level of 
punishment. A gap exists here “between legal and moral blaming,”197 
 
 192. See Kathryn Casteel, A Crackdown on Drug Dealers Is Also a Crackdown on Drug Users, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 5, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://53eig.ht/2JeBxCY [https://perma.cc/624Z-
KGTE] (“Brokers are almost always users who buy drugs from dealers for their friends or other 
users and often get a cut of the heroin in exchange, which allows them to sustain their own 
habits.”).  
 193. Meghan D. Morris, Anna Bates, Erin Andrew, Judith Hahn, Kimberly Page & Lisa 
Maher, More Than Just Someone To Inject Drugs with: Injecting Within Primary Injection 
Partnerships, 156 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 275, 275 (2015) (“Injection drug use is a 
highly social activity. Drug procurement processes often necessitate resource pooling, and peer 
networks provide an important resource for securing drugs and connecting with dealers.”).  
 194. See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
52 (2007) (“Unless persons are culpable for a state of affairs—at least negligent—no censure for 
that state of affairs is deserved.”). 
 195. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of the U.S. Att’y, E. Dist. of North Carolina, Raleigh 
Man Receives Concurrent Life Sentences for Heroin Overdose Death and Conspiracy (Apr. 29, 
2020) [hereinafter U.S. Att’y E. Dist. of N.C. Press Release], https://www.justice.gov/usao-ednc/pr/
raleigh-man-receives-concurrent-life-sentences-heroin-overdose-death-and-conspiracy [https://
perma.cc/5VT2-6Y6Q]. Notably, the prosecutor discussed the defendant’s blameworthiness in mens 
rea terms, stating he was “fully aware” of the danger of the drugs he was distributing, and “[h]e knew 
that his customers were overdosing,” but showed “zero regard for [his] community.” Id. That 
language suggests a mental state of recklessness or depraved indifference, a far higher level of mens 
rea than the statute actually requires. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2018) (requiring no mens rea as 
to the death resulting element).  
 196. Minnesota Woman Pleads Guilty in Methadone Death, CBS MINN. (Aug. 19, 2014, 6:18 
AM), http://cbsloc.al/1rRVe3E [https://perma.cc/HX35-ELYR].  
 197. Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 269 (1987). 
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one which becomes more discomfiting as the chasm between the moral 
blameworthiness and the imposed punishment widens. 
The culpability gap view explains why some past challenges to 
DIH statutes have not raised due process concerns but instead raised 
claims of cruel and unusual punishment.198 More frequently, challenges 
to these statutes focused on other claims such as vagueness, lack of 
notice, causal remoteness of the conduct to the death, or intervening 
cause issues.199 Though many claims have been unsuccessful,200 some 
convictions were overturned, often when there was insufficient 
evidence to prove the defendant directly caused the death.201 These 
cases can be seen as another attempt to close the culpability gap—
trying to more directly connect blameworthy conduct to the charged 
crime.202 Though the few due process claims brought under these 
statutes are usually quickly dispatched, 203 it is worth considering if a 
DIH prosecution could create such a disconnect between culpability 
and punishment that it would raise constitutional concerns.204 
 
 198. E.g., State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1175–77 (N.J. 1994).  
 199. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 9.  
 200. E.g., Jackson v. State, 292 So. 3d 1284, 1286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020); People v. Nere, 
115 N.E.3d 205, 214–15 (Ill. 2018). 
 201. E.g., Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 219 (2014); People v. Coots, 968 N.E.2d 
1151, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).  
 202. See HUSAK, supra note 194, at 53 (“[T]ests of proximate causation often serve to mitigate 
the harshness of doctrines in the criminal law that dispense with culpability—like the felony 
murder rule . . . . They function[] as a surrogate for culpability.”). 
 203. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 208 (granting certiorari on issues of causation and 
foreseeability). Although petitioner argued that (1) the severity of the penalty placed the offense 
outside the realm of acceptable public welfare offenses and (2) that the statute required mens rea 
as to the resulting death to avoid violating due process, Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 26, 28–29, 
Burrage, 571 U.S. 204 (No. 12-7515), the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction solely on 
causation grounds, Burrage, 571 U.S. at 218–19. Other courts have also dismissed due process 
challenges. See, e.g., Maldonado, 645 A.2d at 1170–73 (rejecting the defendant’s due process 
argument by accepting the statute as a permissible public welfare offense, despite the severity of 
the penalty).  
 204. A district court case suggests that there may be room for due process claims to be raised. 
The Middle District of Florida, reviewing a conviction under the state possession statute discussed 
infra Part III.C, cited Lambert and applied the tripartite Staples analysis to invalidate the statute 
as facially violative of due process. Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1300–
06 (M.D. Fla. 2011), rev’d, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012). The Eleventh Circuit reversed, 
reasoning that the Supreme Court precedent did not provide clear due process holdings, and 
deferred to the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute. Shelton, 691 F.3d at 1349. 
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B. The Issues with a Public Welfare DIH Model 
These due process concerns are even more apparent when treating 
DIH statutes as public welfare offenses. Per the jurisprudence, a public 
welfare offense should only be justified if the punishment is low, the 
stigma is light, or if the conduct being regulated is inherently 
dangerous.205 Through this lens, it is a struggle to justify DIH laws. This 
Section considers how DIH laws fare under these factors, looking to a 
specific state statute as an illustration. 
1. Punishment, Stigma, and Danger.  It is unclear exactly how much 
punishment is permissible in the absence of mens rea. The Supreme 
Court has rejected penalties of ten years’206 and three years’ 
imprisonment207 as too harsh, but has also upheld a penalty of five 
years.208 Lower federal courts have taken an even stronger stance, 
finding that two years’ imprisonment was unconstitutional.209 Although 
it is difficult to draw a sharp line and declare that two, or three, or five 
years may be consistent with due process, it is apparent that penalties 
exceeding fifteen years raise serious constitutional concerns.210  
In contrast, the majority of DIH laws far exceed any sentence 
considered permissible under a traditional public welfare analysis, 
imposing severe punishments ranging from ten years’ imprisonment to 
the death penalty.211 These sentences, imposed in the absence of mens 
rea, appear potentially “too severe to pass constitutional muster.”212 
Additionally, DIH convictions impose indisputably heavy stigmas. 
Nearly all jurisdictions classify these laws as felonies, often elevating 
 
 205. Supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text. 
 206. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616–18 (1994). 
 207. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 442 n.18 (1978). 
 208. United States v. Balint, 58 U.S. 250, 254 (1922); supra note 128. 
 209. United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985). But see United States v. 
Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431–35 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding a two-year conviction under the same 
statute at issue in United States v. Wulff, but acknowledging “that the analysis takes place on a 
very slippery slope”). 
 210. See United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1978) (stating that if Congress 
attempted to create a strict liability crime that carried a penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment, 
“the Constitution would be offended”); Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 
1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (“[T]he Court has not located[] any precedent applying federal law to 
sustain a penalty of fifteen years, thirty years, and/or life imprisonment for a strict liability 
offense.”), rev’d, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012).  
 211. Supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.  
 212. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1302; see also id. (“Sentences of fifteen years, thirty years, and 
life imprisonment are not by any measure ‘relatively small.’” (quoting Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1125)).  
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them to the level of second- or first-degree murder.213 Labeling a 
defendant as a felon causes “irreparable damage” to their reputation, 
especially when combined with a “proclamation that [they are] so vile 
[they] must be separated from society for . . . years.”214 
DIH statutes’ presumptive constitutionality, then, depends on the 
premise that those prosecuted under them are engaging in inherently 
dangerous conduct and that these laws are rational measures taken to 
ensure safety.215 This view takes into account the fact that “[d]rug 
distribution puts the entire society at risk.”216 Undoubtedly, to some 
degree, “drug crimes undermine the basic fabric of our social and legal 
institutions,” and perhaps “none of these offenses can be fairly 
characterized as victimless.”217 Even in the absence of an intent to 
cause death, distributing and using drugs, at the very least, creates a 
risk of harm. Thus, states arguably should have broad discretion to 
impose whatever measures necessary to protect the public from 
opioids, even if this may cause unfair or unjust results.218  
Although this argument has merit, it lacks a limiting principle. A 
vast range of conduct can conceivably be described as harmful to the 
public. Intentional murder is harmful to public welfare, as is rape, or 
burglary, or arson. All of these offenses are at least as morally 
blameworthy as drug distribution, if not more so. Yet our criminal 
system predominately requires a finding of specific intent in order to 
impose criminal sanctions. Additionally, this argument overlooks the 
futility and inefficacy of DIH laws, which do not successfully save lives, 
deter drug use, or solve the very problems they purport to address.219 
2. A Public Welfare Example: New Jersey.  New Jersey’s DIH 
statute is illustrative. New Jersey imposes first-degree strict liability for 
any death resulting from the distribution of controlled substances, 
 
 213. Supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text; LASALLE, supra note 4, app. A. 
 214. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1302; see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal 
Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 424 (1958) (“[A] criminal conviction carries with it an 
ineradicable connotation of moral condemnation and personal guilt.”). 
 215. Supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. 
 216. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1174 (N.J. 1994).  
 217. W. Cary Edwards, An Overview of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, 13 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 13, 17 (1989). 
 218. See Maldonado, 645 A.2d at 1172 (“[T]he conduct sought to be deterred—illegal drug 
manufacture and drug distribution—is also widely regarded as constituting the most substantial 
threat to public safety that now exists.”).  
 219. Infra Part IV.A.  
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imposing a ten- to twenty-year term of imprisonment.220 Mens rea is 
required for the distribution only.221 The statute’s placement in the 
criminal code, listed under “Offenses Against Public Order, Health 
and Decency,”222 suggests this DIH law was enacted as a regulatory, 
public welfare offense. Given the severity of the criminal sanction, 
however, New Jersey courts have instead analogized it to felony 
murder.223  
New Jersey courts are seemingly unbothered by this cognitive 
dissonance. Finding that “whatever injustice results from strict liability 
is more than counterbalanced by benefit to the public,” New Jersey 
courts evaluating DIH charges have claimed that “the Constitution 
places a lesser burden . . . to justify strict liability for serious criminal 
offenses than for regulatory offenses.”224 Mens rea is not required 
toward the resulting death, the courts claim, because “moral 
culpability . . . is inextricably embedded in the drug death statute.”225  
The penalty is too high and the associated stigma too great to 
satisfactorily categorize New Jersey’s law as a valid public welfare 
offense. Yet, New Jersey takes the logical justifications for public 
welfare offenses—administrative convenience, easing the path to 
prosecution by dispensing with proof of intent—and applies them to a 
serious criminal offense, claiming that ultimately, the legislature’s 
“rational conclusion that the safety of the public requires such 
draconian measures is enough.”226 The law presumes that the mere act 
of delivering drugs is sufficiently immoral and dangerous to justify 
imposing the most severe form of liability for homicide. But given who 
is actually being prosecuted under these laws and given how ineffective 
DIH statutes are at protecting the public,227 New Jersey’s justifications 
ring hollow. 
 
 220. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2016) (“Any person who manufactures, distributes or 
dispenses . . . any . . . controlled dangerous substance . . . is strictly liable for a death which results 
from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance . . . .”); id. § 2C:43-6(1). 
 221. See Maldonado, 645 A.2d at 1170. 
 222. Chapter 35, “Controlled Dangerous Substances,” is located within Title 2C, Subtitle 2, 
Part 5, entitled “Offenses Against Public Order, Health, and Decency.” 
 223. Maldonado, 645 A.2d at 1170 (“Criminal liability [here] . . . is similar to liability for 
felony murder.”). 
 224. Id. at 1171–72 (emphasis added). 
 225. Id. at 1174. 
 226. Id. at 1172. 
 227. Infra Part IV.A. 
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C. Felony Murder and DIH Laws  
If DIH statutes cannot be logically justified as public welfare 
offenses, they might be better understood as felony murder analogs. 
The problems with felony murder—already “rationally 
indefensible”228—are sharply apparent when examined in the DIH 
context, particularly considering the extreme ends to which Florida has 
gone. 
1. Felony Murder and DIH Laws Are Conceptually Distinct.  
Though the continued existence of felony murder implies that DIH 
laws are valid, they are two fundamentally different concepts. Scholars 
arguing for a principled interpretation of the felony murder rule 
contend that it should be limited to inherently dangerous felonies such 
as “[r]ape, robbery, arson, kidnapping, and murder (of a different 
victim),” and should exclude drug distribution felonies, which impose 
comparatively less risk and do so “with the apparent consent of the 
victim.”229 Many states have, in fact, specifically limited their felony 
 
 228. Sanford H. Kadish, Supreme Court Review, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck 
of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 681 (1994). 
 229. Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, supra note 158, at 1045–46. For purposes of 
this Note, this Section limits its analysis to the felony murder conception articulated by Professors 
David Crump and Guyora Binder, among others. Crump and Binder limit felony murder liability 
to situations of moral desert, as “the rule’s most important purpose is enhancing the connection 
between moral blameworthiness and the imposition of criminal liability.” David Crump, 
Reconsidering the Felony Murder Rule in Light of Modern Criticisms: Doesn’t the Conclusion 
Depend on the Particular Rule at Issue?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1155, 1161–62 (2009). Binder 
argues that modern criticism of felony murder stems in part from a misconception of the rule “as 
strict liability for accidental deaths occurring in the context of felonies,” when the historical 
understanding of the rule was one that “deservedly imposed [liability], according to defensible 
criteria of culpability.” Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 59, 186 (2004). In line with this concept, most states limit their felony murder rule, either 
by restricting the rule to an enumerated list of violent or inherently dangerous predicate felonies, 
or through judicial decisions that have narrowed the application of the doctrine. Roth & Sundby, 
supra note 154, at 446 nn.6–8. 
There are, however, states that have more expansive lists of predicate felonies, not limited 
only to violent ones, and states that have no specific enumerated predicate felonies at all, 
presumably imposing liability for death resulting during the commission of any felony. See John 
O’Herron, Felony Murder Without a Felony Limitation: Predicate Felonies and Practical Concerns 
in the States, 46 No. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. ART. 4 (2010) (documenting each state’s approach to felony 
murder and predicate felonies). Some scholars have pointed out the innate issues with the more 
expansive applications, arguing that “an application of the felony murder doctrine in the case of 
an accidental death during a non-dangerous felony would result in elevating a harmless intent to 
one of murder,” and noting that imposing liability in this way “ends up over-punishing the felon.” 
Id. These expansive statutes might very well raise their own due process issues, particularly as the 
modern era of overcriminalization has created felonies that were never considered at common 
law. See HUSAK, supra note 194, at 40–41 (describing, among other new crimes, the creation of 
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murder laws to those general categories.230 While felony murder 
ostensibly punishes individuals for “callously impos[ing] risks of death 
in order to achieve additional serious wrongs,”231 DIH laws 
unavoidably target addicts, persons struggling with a “chronic, 
relapsing disorder in which compulsive drug-seeking and drug-taking 
behavior persists despite serious negative consequences.”232 While the 
dangers of using drugs are undeniable, there is a tangible difference in 
the moral blameworthiness of the classic examples of felony murder—
the bank robber who unintentionally shoots a clerk, the rapist who 
unintentionally kills their victim mid-assault233—and the moral 
blameworthiness of two addicts sharing heroin.  
2. An Extreme Felony Murder Example: Florida.  These tangible 
differences become even more apparent when examining how far 
Florida has stretched the doctrine. Florida’s DIH law is interpreted by 
its courts as a form of felony murder, albeit an “unusual” version,234 as 
the defendant does not need to intend that death result, have 
knowledge of the overdose, or be present when the death occurs.235 If 
a death results from the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, 
the distributor is liable for first-degree murder, subject to a mandatory 
minimum sentence of life in prison, and potentially subject to the death 
penalty.236  
Complicating things, Florida has separately established that 
distributing unlawful drugs does not require knowledge of the “illicit 
nature of the controlled substance.”237 According to this construction, 
 
new ancillary offenses that have “n[o] common-law analogues”). Though it is beyond the scope 
of this Note, many of the arguments asserted here could also apply to these expansive felony 
murder statutes.  
 230. See HUSAK, supra note 194, at 51 (noting that in “many states,” felony-murder rules are 
“restricted to a small number of specifically enumerated felonies—robbery, sexual assault, arson, 
burglary, kidnapping, or criminal escape”).  
 231. Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, supra note 158, at 966. 
 232. Jordi Camí & Magí Farré, Mechanisms of Disease: Drug Addiction, 349 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 975, 975 (2003). 
 233. Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, supra note 158, at 966. 
 234. E.g., Pena v. State, 829 So. 2d 289, 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). Florida defines first-
degree murder as either “premeditated,” as caused in the perpetration of an enumerated felony, 
or as drug-induced homicide. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(1)–(3) (West 2017 & Supp. 2020). 
 235. Pena, 829 So. 2d at 294. 
 236. §§ 775.082(1)(a), 782.04(1)(a)(3).  
 237. Id. § 893.101(2)–(3); see State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 416 (Fla. 2012) (“The statute thus 
expressly eliminates knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance as an element of 
controlled substance offenses . . . . The statute does not eliminate the element of knowledge of 
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a defendant could distribute a substance that they did not know was 
heroin and then be liable for first-degree murder if a death resulted 
from the ingestion of that heroin.238  
Further complicating this DIH provision is the fact that Florida, 
alone among all states, has an attempted felony murder provision.239 
Setting aside the fundamental illogic of removing mens rea from the 
crime of attempt,240 this allows prosecution for attempted DIH. Simply 
put, if a person delivered drugs to another, without even knowing they 
were drugs, and the other person experienced a non-fatal overdose, the 
person who delivered the substance could be liable for attempted 
felony murder. Though this charge does not yet appear to have been 
brought in the DIH context, there is little stopping a prosecutor from 
doing so.241  
 
the presence of the substance . . . .”). A defendant can raise their lack of knowledge as an 
affirmative defense to any relevant controlled substance offense. Id. § 893.101(2). However, if the 
defendant raises this affirmative defense, the jury will be instructed that there is a “permissive 
presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance.” § 893.101(3). Notably, 
this shifts the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the defendant, requiring the defendant to 
disprove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without 
Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 710, 710 n.336 (2012) (stating that legislatures 
can do this “by reclassifying elements closely associated with culpability, including mens rea, as 
affirmative defenses,” and pointing out that Florida’s strict liability drug statute does exactly that). 
 238. Consider this hypothetical situation: Michael asks his friend, Charles, to do him a favor 
and deliver a bag to his sister, Amy. Charles agrees and brings the bag to Amy; he looks inside 
the bag on the way and sees a package containing a substance he does not recognize. The package 
contains heroin, which Amy consumes, causing a fatal overdose. Despite no intent to harm Amy 
or knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance, Charles has just committed felony DIH. It is 
hard to imagine that this extreme application of Florida’s law would not be at least susceptible to 
a due process challenge.  
 239. See State v. Sanders, 827 S.E.2d 214, 218 n.8 (W. Va. 2019) (“[O]nly the State of Florida 
has codified the crime of attempted felony-murder . . . .” (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.051)). 
Section 782.051 provides, in part: “Any person who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate any 
felony . . . and who commits, aids, or abets an intentional act that is not an essential element of 
the felony and that could, but does not, cause the death of another commits a felony of the first 
degree.” 
 240. See Amlotte v. State, 456 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. 1984) (Overton, J., dissenting) (pointing 
out that this “create[s] a crime which necessitates the finding of an intent to commit a crime which 
requires no proof of intent”), cited with approval in State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla. 1995) 
(“[T]he crime of attempted felony murder is logically impossible.”), superseded by statute, 
§ 782.051. 
 241. The attempted felony murder provision also requires the defendant “commit[], aid[], or 
abet[] an intentional act that is not an essential element of the felony and that could, but does not, 
cause the death of another.” § 782.051(2). To return to the previous hypothetical, supra note 238, 
imagine that after Charles found the substance, he encouraged Amy to try it, and helped her 
ingest it. Amy overdosed, but survived. Even if unwitting Charles did not know what the 
substance was when he helped Amy consume it, he is now liable for attempted DIH, a first-degree 
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These hypotheticals seem, and are, extreme. Current 
jurisprudence, however, does not preclude them. Despite the 
contrasting messages sent by an innocent-protecting Court, the body 
of precedent functionally validating strict liability homicides makes it 
unlikely that DIH statutes could be facially invalidated as 
unconstitutional. But this dubious insulation from constitutional 
attacks does not resolve or justify their inconsistencies with due 
process. Resolving these issues, then, falls to the legislature. 
IV.  A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
A legislature currently has wide discretion to enact strict liability 
DIH statutes; this does not mean that it should enact them. Even if one 
agrees with the doctrinal precedent that there may be no mens rea 
guarantee in the Constitution, this does not eliminate the possibility 
that DIH laws are used in ways that are repugnant to our foundational 
concepts of justice. Considering the structural protections our system 
provides for the accused, these laws, while perhaps not 
unconstitutional, can be considered anti-constitutional. In any event, 
calling DIH laws constitutional is not the same as calling them just, or 
even rational. 
This Part examines the irrationality of DIH laws, positing that in 
addition to the constitutional concerns they raise, these laws are 
unnecessary and ineffective. It then proposes various ways that state 
legislatures can attempt to mitigate the flawed policy and fundamental 
injustice of these laws. 
A. Policy Considerations  
Unsurprisingly, many see DIH laws as an essential tool to mitigate 
the overdose crisis, one justified by the extent of the crisis and the 
moral blameworthiness of those involved.242 This justification, 
however, would be more compelling if DIH laws were actually 
effective in protecting the public welfare. Instead, they contravene 
more recently enacted laws that better reflect current priorities and 
societal values. 
 
felony. If Charles truly had no knowledge of the type of substance, a conviction here also seems 
like it could be a due process violation.  
 242. See Neil, supra note 23, at 28 (stating DIH statutes may not be a “silver bullet to the 
public health crisis this nation faces,” but are a useful tool to focus on the “drug dealers who take 
advantage of those who have become addicted to opioids”). 
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1. DIH Statutes Are Not Life-Saving Measures.  Contrary to the 
premise that DIH laws are necessary to save lives, DIH laws are likely 
to contravene life-saving initiatives and instead “aggravate the 
problems they purport to address.”243 In the past few years, many states 
and law enforcement departments have poured extensive resources 
into harm-reduction initiatives, such as expanding access to naloxone 
to prevent overdose deaths244 or enacting Good Samaritan laws to 
provide limited criminal immunity for individuals reporting an 
overdose.245  
DIH laws are fundamentally at “cross-purposes with these 
important efforts.”246 Some state prosecutors have even targeted the 
use of these safety measures, treating signs of naloxone use at an 
overdose scene as evidence that a homicide may have occurred.247 
Rather than saving lives, stigmatizing drug addicts as murderers makes 
it less likely that they will come forward for treatment, rehabilitation, 
or life-saving assistance. Additionally, the majority of Good Samaritan 
laws only offer protection from lower possession offenses, not other 
charges such as DIH.248 Studies have shown that “overdose bystanders 
are known to delay or refrain from calling 911” due to “[f]ear of police 
involvement” and that most drug users, and many law enforcement 
officers, are not even aware that these Good Samaritan laws exist.249 
Conversely, DIH prosecutions are widely publicized.250 The 
 
 243. Brief of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Health in Justice Action Lab 
at Northeastern University School of Law, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Defendant at 34, 
Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d 812 (2019) (No. SJC-12617) [hereinafter Carrillo Amicus 
Brief]. 
 244. Drug Overdose Immunity and Good Samaritan Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(June 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/drug-overdose-immunity-
good-samaritan-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/F854-MRYY]. 
 245. Good Samaritan Overdose Prevention Laws, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE POL’Y SYS., 
http://pdaps.org/datasets/good-samaritan-overdose-laws-1501695153 [https://perma.cc/JAD2-
WMXP] (reporting laws valid at least through July 1, 2018).  
 246. Carrillo Amicus Brief, supra note 243, at 34. 
 247. See Daugherty & Stachula, supra note 83, at 31 (“Look for evidence of [Naloxone] use 
at the crime scene. This may be evidence that your victim was with someone prior to their 
death.”). 
 248. DRUG POL’Y ALL., 911 GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS: PREVENTING OVERDOSE DEATHS, 
SAVING LIVES 1 (Feb. 2016), https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA_Fact%20Sheet
_911%20Good%20Samaritan%20Laws_%28Feb.%202016%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GHG-
69VV]. 
 249. Amanda D. Latimore & Rachel S. Bergstein, “Caught with a Body” Yet Protected by 
Law? Calling 911 for Opioid Overdose in the Context of the Good Samaritan Law, 50 INT’L J. 
DRUG POL’Y 82, 82 (2017).  
 250. Supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.  
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increasingly publicized use of DIH laws may cause drug users to use 
alone or deter people from seeking help in an emergency, increasing 
their risk of death from overdose.251 
2. DIH Statutes Do Not Effectively Incapacitate or Deter.  Nor do 
these laws effectively mitigate the opioid crisis. DIH laws tend to only 
imprison low-level dealers or users, not larger drug suppliers.252 Some 
lawmakers argue that imprisoning lower-level users may successfully 
work to dismantle large supply chains, as “drug kingpins could not 
operate profitably absent a steady demand for controlled dangerous 
substances.”253 History has shown, however, that incarcerating lower-
level users does nothing to stop the actual supply of opioids from 
continuing to flow to those who want them.254 DIH laws thus attempt 
to reduce supply but do nothing to address the problem of demand.  
Additionally, these laws are not likely to deter drug use. In theory, 
the existence of these DIH laws may not only deter people from 
distributing drugs, but might also “keep[] a relatively large class of 
persons from engaging in certain kinds of activity,” such as using drugs, 
in the first place.255 However, not only is it debatable exactly how much 
of a deterrent effect these laws may have on someone who is dedicated 
to criminal drug trafficking,256 but these arguments also overlook that 
a defining feature of addiction is “compulsive drug seeking and use,” 
notwithstanding “well-known and severe negative consequences.”257 In 
 
 251. See Travis Lupick, If They Die of an Overdose, Drug Users Have a Last Request, YES! 
MAG. (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.yesmagazine.org/democracy/2018/08/31/if-they-die-of-an-
overdose-drug-users-have-a-last-request [https://perma.cc/LH9M-HTE2] (“In public health 
messaging, the first thing that’s said is, ‘Don’t use alone.’ . . . But in this context, it can mean that 
if I go and score some drugs, and then I share those drugs with you . . . that relationship is targeted 
in prosecutions.” (quoting Leo Beletsky)).  
 252. See LASALLE, supra note 4, at 42 (stating that due to the requirement of proving 
causation, “charges become more difficult the higher up the distribution chain one goes”). 
 253. Edwards, supra note 217, at 13; see also id. at 14 (“[A]n appropriately stern sanction must 
be imposed upon drug users, without whom the dealers and profiteers would have neither a 
market nor a reason to exist.”).  
 254. See Beletsky, supra note 55, at 849 (“By narrowly defining the ‘opioid epidemic’ as a 
purely supply-driven phenomenon, decision-makers overlooked proven prevention and response 
tools. These missteps led the crisis to morph from bad to worse.” (footnote omitted)).  
 255. Wasserstrom, supra note 42, at 736–37.  
 256. See Grady, supra note 85 (quoting Waukesha County District Attorney Sue Opper: “I 
would say the drug dealers don’t care (because) they’re motivated by greed;” and Milwaukee 
County District Attorney John Chishom: “The deterrence in and of itself does not change the 
behavior as long as the incentive is too great”).  
 257. Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCI. 45, 45 (1997); see 
also Carrillo Amicus Brief, supra note 243, at 45 (“[T]hese prosecutions lack a deterrent effect, 
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fact, no empirical evidence supports that harsher enforcement has any 
correlation to a reduction in drug activity,258 and further, there is reason 
to suspect that “drug enforcement activities actually lead to increases 
in violent crime.”259 
For proponents of DIH laws, sacrificing mens rea requirements 
and historical notions of fairness may be a necessary sacrifice for the 
public good. But considering these laws have limited deterrent effect, 
do not reduce the rate of overdose deaths, and contravene other 
legislative initiatives enacted to protect the public, justifying their 
utility is difficult. Perhaps the only valid rationale for DIH laws is 
retributive—to punish those whose actions, however indirectly, lead to 
death. When applied to the Jarret McCaslands of the world, this seems 
like nothing more than punishing an addict for the fact of their 
addiction.260  
B. Legislative Solutions 
As discussed above, though there are serious due process concerns 
with DIH laws, it would be difficult to effectively challenge them in 
court. If any change to these DIH statutes is to occur, it must be part 
of a legislative initiative. Rather than relying on retributive impulses 
 
particularly against people suffering from addiction. There is a broad consensus among scholars 
and policy analysts that the threat of legal sanction does not deter drug dealing or drug use, even 
when the threatened punishments are increased.”). 
 258. Daniel Stein, Pew Analysis Finds No Relationship Between Drug Imprisonment and Drug 
Problems, PEW TRS. (June 19, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
speeches-and-testimony/2017/06/pew-analysis-finds-no-relationship-between-drug-
imprisonment-and-drug-problems [https://perma.cc/V48Q-MB3L].  
 259. Carrillo Amicus Brief, supra note 243, at 47 (emphasis added); see also id. (“So long as 
demand for illegal drugs exists, attempts to constrict the drug supply by incarcerating traffickers 
will continue to lead to the ‘replacement effect,’ whereby individuals or organizations quickly fill 
the void created by enforcement activities.”).  
 260. Jarret’s case is illustrative. It was not clear what Flavia’s exact cause of death was, nor 
who, if anyone, had given her the heroin. Supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. It was only 
clear that she was using while with Jarret, a fellow addict—a circumstance apparently sufficient 
to sentence him to life in prison without parole. Supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
As previously discussed, prosecutors have used DIH laws broadly, often charging a person, 
usually a fellow addict, who happened to be with the victim when they died. Supra notes 32–33 
and accompanying text. Though to the Author’s knowledge no one has directly challenged these 
laws as status crimes, it is important to remember that the Supreme Court has declared that 
criminalizing addiction is unconstitutional. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) 
(stating that “narcotic addiction is an illness” and holding “that a state law which imprisons a 
person thus afflicted as a criminal . . . inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). In the wake of increased DIH prosecutions, some have suggested that 
it is worth exploring litigation that “reviv[es] this line of constitutional argument.” Beletsky, supra 
note 55, at 856–58.  
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and ineffective drug-war policies, state legislatures should look at 
alternate ways to prevent overdose deaths without sacrificing 
fundamental criminal justice principles.261 This Section outlines three 
ways a legislature could resolve the due process issues DIH laws 
implicate. 
1. Repeal DIH Statutes.  As DIH laws contravene their own 
purpose, fail to mitigate the opioid crisis, and run counter to our 
foundations of criminal justice, the most principled legislative response 
is to repeal them entirely. The tide of criminal justice is slowly moving 
toward reform, and DIH laws should be no exception. Legislatures can 
and should invalidate these strict liability homicides as inconsistent 
with the basic principles of our criminal justice system.  
States may resist repealing these laws, clinging to the justifications 
outlined above. For the truly culpable, however, alternatives are 
available. States with DIH laws also have extensive drug possession 
and trafficking offenses that more directly target the actual socially 
harmful conduct that is occurring.262 In the most extreme 
circumstances, states can still attempt to prosecute overdose deaths as 
negligent or reckless homicides,263 theories of liability that necessarily 
require the state to prove the mental state and culpability of the 
individual to achieve a conviction.  
2. Include a Higher Mens Rea Component.  Similarly, if legislatures 
are unwilling to fully repeal DIH statutes, they can amend them to 
better align with due process principles. For one, legislatures could 
severely reduce the homicide liability and penalty, transforming them 
into more classic representations of public welfare offenses. This 
approach would remove the homicide classification entirely, 
 
 261. These proposed solutions are primarily aimed at state legislatures. Although there is a 
federal DIH law in the form of a “death results” provision in the CSA, the current stall on 
legislative activity emerging from the federal government makes it unlikely that Congress would 
be the first mover on amending any such legislation. See Carl Hulse, Amid Rancor in House, It’s 
Quiet in the Halls of the Senate. Too Quiet., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2OXC2X0 
[https://perma.cc/RC7X-9VPC] (discussing descriptions of the current U.S. Senate as a 
“legislative graveyard”).  
 262. For example, a defendant who recently received a life sentence for DIH also received a 
concurrent life sentence for Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with the Intent to Distribute, 
thirty years for Possession with the Intent to Distribute a Quantity of Heroin, and ten years for 
Possession of a Firearm by a Felon. U.S. Att’y E. Dist. of N.C. Press Release, supra note 195.  
 263. Neil, supra note 23, at 27. 
PHILLIPS IN PRINTER FINAL 11/16/2020  7:39 PM 
702  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:659 
categorizing them instead as minor criminal offenses imposing a fine 
but no prison term.  
Alternatively, these statutes could retain their homicide 
classifications but require a mens rea element of criminal negligence or 
recklessness toward the resulting death. Under a recklessness standard, 
there would not be a “per se rule that the distribution of heroin alone, 
without more, suffices to support a verdict;” instead, the law would 
require a fact-specific inquiry into each case to determine if the 
defendant’s conduct created a “high degree of likelihood that 
substantial harm [would] result.”264 Treating drug-overdose offenses in 
this way, closer to how some states treat vehicular manslaughter,265 
would offer a path to prosecution for the truly culpable offender while 
mitigating many due process concerns currently implicated by DIH 
statutes. 
3. Specifically Target Large-Scale Distributors.  A final approach 
is to amend DIH statutes in a way that specifically addresses the type 
of conduct these laws purport to address—namely, large-scale drug 
dealing. DIH statutes could be amended for use only when certain 
aggravating factors were present, such as “if the victim were an 
unwitting user of the illegal substance; if there were multiple deaths 
involved with one batch of drugs [or] if the dealer were a high-level 
distributor.”266 States could modify the drug-distribution element of 
the offense, requiring that a large amount of the drug be distributed 
before DIH liability attaches.  
In theory, some of the policy concerns about the way these laws 
are prosecuted could be alleviated by focusing on upper-level 
traffickers rather than charging fellow addicts sharing drugs. Some 
states have already begun taking this approach. In response to 
 
 264. Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d 812, 819, 826, 828 n.10 (Mass. 2019); see id. at 
825–26 (detailing various factors to consider, such as if the defendant knew the heroin was laced 
with fentanyl, if the defendant personally injected the deceased, or if the defendant observed the 
victim overdose and failed to call for help).  
 265. For example, New Jersey imposes strict liability on any death resulting from intoxicated 
operation of a vehicle as a third-degree crime. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5.3 (West Supp. 2019). 
The crime can be elevated to second-degree homicide only if the driver was found to be reckless. 
Id. § 2C:11-5. Notably, the strict liability version still carries a minimum prison term of between 
three and five years, id., still far above the traditional public welfare offense level.  
 266. John H. Tucker, Angela Halliday Was a Junkie. Does that Make Her a Murderer?, 
RIVERFRONT TIMES (Aug. 4, 2011) http://www.riverfronttimes.com/2011-08-04/news/angela-
halliday-heroin-overdose-drug-induced-homicide-ben-berkenbile [https://perma.cc/FEJ5-CMUZ] 
(reporting the positions of U.S. Attorney for Eastern Missouri Richard Callahan).  
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criticisms, Mississippi recently modified a proposed DIH law to require 
that the defendant be charged with the transfer of at least two grams of 
opioids in order to be liable for DIH.267 Similarly, Delaware’s current 
statute requires the underlying drug deal to involve at least five grams 
in order to be liable for the homicide charge.268  
These modifications, however, would do little to mitigate the 
overall concerns with these laws. These statutes are not likely to deter 
illicit conduct or to reduce the demand for opioids. Nor do these 
modifications mitigate the ultimate due process issues. Regardless of 
the volume of drugs required to prosecute someone under a DIH law, 
these statutes still impose homicide liability without any requisite proof 
of mens rea. Thus, they remain anathema to foundational concepts of 
justice.  
CONCLUSION 
Jarret McCasland will likely remain in prison for the rest of his 
life. In June 2019, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his application 
to reconsider his untimely appeal—the appeal, filed in May 2017, was 
received three minutes late.269 It is possible that the court, which said it 
would have heard the case on the merits were it timely filed,270 would 
have concluded that Jarret was denied due process, that sentencing him 
to life in prison for a crime he did not intend to commit was an 
egregious miscarriage of justice. It is possible, but unlikely. Relief for 
Jarret and others like him will likely not come from the courts. Without 
strong action from legislatures, DIH statutes will remain in effect and 
will, if the current trend continues, be utilized with increasing fervor.  
The Constitution may not explicitly guarantee a mens rea 
requirement to preserve due process, but the history of our 
jurisprudence demonstrates that for some crimes, narrowing the gap 
between culpability and punishment is imperative to achieve a just 
result. Imposing the most severe sanction the law allows and depriving 
 
 267. Michelle Liu, “Parker’s Law” Would Put Drug Dealers Behind Bars for Overdose 
Deaths, MISS. TODAY (Feb. 4, 2019), https://mississippitoday.org/2019/02/04/parkers-law-would-
charge-dealers-friends-for-drug-overdose-deaths [https://perma.cc/85QA-7SJQ]. 
 268. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752B (2017); id. § 4751C (LEXIS through 82 Del. Laws, ch. 
281). 
 269. Joe Gyan Jr., In Unique Murder Case, Louisiana Court Won’t Hear Denham Springs 
Man’s Untimely Appeal, ADVOCATE (June 17, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/
baton_rouge/news/courts/article_2e239c5a-9145-11e9-945b-0bdf87c1dc81.html [https://perma.cc/
67FD-SKQD]. Jarret’s appellate attorney “blamed the late filing on a computer glitch.” Id.  
 270. Id.  
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an individual of liberty requires care and deliberation, not a mechanical 
finding of guilt based on unfortunate circumstances. Removing a mens 
rea requirement for homicide liability removes the anchor of fairness 
from our criminal justice system. It has been debated whether the 
allowance of strict liability crimes is compatible with what the accepted 
values of society are, or whether the allowance of these crimes is 
incompatible with what accepted values should be.271 This Note asserts 
that DIH laws do not accord with our societal values, and calls on 
legislatures to repeal them before more damage is done. 
 
 
 271. Wasserstrom, supra note 42, at 741. 
